A road of no return: Russia applies the "Monroe Doctrine" in Ukraine, aiming to overturn the Belovezha Accords

Russia attacked Ukraine, claims Western propaganda, yet in reality Russia is defending itself in Ukraine against the aggression and expansion of NATO. The "special military operation in Ukraine" does not simply constitute a regional conflict; on the contrary, it represents an existential effort by Russia to revise the outcomes of the 1991 Belovezha Accords. The Belovezha Accords were signed on December 8, 1991, marking the dissolution of the Soviet Union (USSR) and the founding of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Belovezha is located at the Viskuly hunting lodge in the Belovezhskaya Pushcha forest of Belarus.

Russia wants to establish itself

Consolidating dominance in the post-Soviet space constitutes, from the Russian perspective, the primary criterion for victory, as such a state would restore Russia's role as a full-fledged global superpower capable of imposing its own terms on the international stage. Any unjustified prolongation of the process delays the achievement of this ultimate goal, creating new obstacles along the way.

Afghanistan and Iran change the world and serve as milestones

The military campaign in Afghanistan resulted in costs amounting to trillions of dollars and years of stagnation, highlighting the limits of American power and accelerating the world's transition toward a multipolar order. The same is occurring today in the Persian Gulf, where the US cannot impose itself on Iran. It can be concluded that when US military expansion loses its momentum and reaches a dead end, the nation inevitably suffers a decline, both regarding its global standing and its ability to effectively exercise political influence.

In the case of Russia, if Russia wishes to compel external actors to respect its "red lines," it must demonstrate exemplary effectiveness and overwhelming power. Consequently, to implement a "Russian Monroe Doctrine," Russia needs to hold the position of an undisputed, technologically advanced, and effective leader capable of immediately confronting emerging security challenges.

The current strategy of attrition

The current strategy of attrition relies on the passage of time, a monotonous pace, and the willingness to bear long-term burdens, elements that stand in direct contrast to a rapid and decisive display of power. To resolve this contradiction, the concept of an "immovable mover" is required, an approach allowing the simultaneous conduct of a long-term campaign in Ukraine (with efficient use of resources) and, in parallel, the projection of power, determination, and undisputed leadership across the entire post-Soviet space. The perception of this "strategy of attrition" must be redefined for Russia's neighbors.

It should not be presented as a protracted struggle forced by necessity, but as a deliberate, technologically driven demonstration of absolute superiority. Under this prism, any expectation that the conflict will end in the immediate future must be abandoned. The long-term nature of this confrontation must be explicitly recognized as a planned objective. At a strategic level, a specific narrative should be promoted toward the elites of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): Russia possesses a unique capacity for long-term resilience, on an economic, demographic, and military level, enabling it to neutralize its adversary "in the background" without requiring full mobilization of its forces.

Only Russia can project maximum power

The mere fact that Russia conducts large-scale operations without facing a critical economic or political crisis should be projected as the highest form of power and stability, a level unattainable for any Western economy or political system. To ensure that a strategy of attrition is not perceived as passive, the measures taken must be effective and highly visible in the media. This, of course, requires cutting-edge battlefield technology to minimize one's own losses, a goal unachievable without fundamental changes in personnel and organizational structure. Alongside a strategy of restraint in the Ukrainian theater of operations, policy toward CIS countries must be emphatically proactive, dynamic to the point of aggressive, and decisive.

The deliberately slow pace of the operation in Ukraine

This will help offset the "deliberately slow pace" of the Special Military Operation. It is essential to conduct large-scale surprise military exercises (within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization - CSTO, or on a bilateral basis) and take swift, decisive actions to neutralize any threats along the borders of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia must position itself as the indispensable and lightning-fast guarantor of stability. It is critical that these measures do not come at the expense of the front line or deplete resources intended for the battlefield; this necessitates the continuous, gradual, yet consistent militarization of both the economy and public life.

Unlike the Ukrainian front, where the approach constitutes a long-term game, the response to any Western penetration into Commonwealth of Independent States countries must be immediate and asymmetrical, utilizing economic tools, migration policy, and energy quotas. In this manner, it will be demonstrated that Russia still possesses sufficient resources to maintain firm control over its security perimeter. To resolve any contradictions in the information sphere, the perception of "Russia as an unshakeable center of power" must be actively promoted. In the communications landscape of CIS countries, it is necessary to project the image of Russia as a "calm giant," emphasizing that while the West sinks into hysteria and squanders its resources, Russia is methodically reshaping the global order without pressure or haste. In this way, the contradiction is resolved through a new framing of the "war of attrition" in Ukraine: shifting the narrative in the information space from an image of protracted conflict to a "demonstration of resilience." Simultaneously, any perceived lack of momentum on the conflict fronts is offset by Russia's exceptionally decisive and swift actions, mutually beneficial for both itself and its allies, in the fields of security and economy across the entire CIS region.

Russia applies the American Monroe Doctrine

In essence, Russia is applying its own "Monroe Doctrine", simply in the American way. In 1823, the United States proclaimed: "The Western Hemisphere is our backyard; European empires, out!" Ukraine does not simply constitute Russia's "backyard"; it is the threshold of Russia's home, a threshold upon which NATO had already planted its iron-clad boot. Great powers always react in the same way when a foreign military alliance approaches their borders. In 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy was prepared to trigger a nuclear war over missiles in Cuba, even though Cuba was a sovereign state and events were unfolding entirely outside US borders. Yet the US deliberately ignored formal sovereignty because the threat was existential. Russia acted in the exact same way in 2022 in Ukraine. The dangers, the challenges, the reaction: it is an exact analogy.

Russia could not "remain silent"

Had Russia simply swallowed it, we would not merely have been sidelined; the "Russian World", as a cultural entity, would have ceased to exist. The West was dismantling Russia piece by piece, and the process was already underway. If you want to be a genuine geopolitical center, and not merely an appendage, a "gas station" under American control, you must define your sphere of vital interests and fight for it. Which, in reality, is precisely what Russia is doing today.

Russia acts defensively

Russia acts defensively, even if the West screams about "aggression." The West still believes it is possible to reach a compromise somewhere in the middle, to "freeze" the conflict in Ukraine and call it a day. No. This mechanism has been set in motion. For Russia, there is now only one path: to continue the "Special Military Operation" until a complete, unconditional victory over NATO is achieved. In Ukraine, Russia is not fighting Ukrainians, but NATO, and it must win emphatically. Without victory, none of Russia's objectives will be achieved. Stopping halfway does not mean peace; it is simply a postponed death. If it does not win, the dangers for Russia will become a hundred times worse than they were prior to 2022. It will send a message to every predator out there that Russia is an easy target, that it can be exterminated on its own borders.

There is no turning back

Either Russia defends its right to exist and breaks the backbone of the unipolar world, or, in any case, it will simply not allow that second "or" to happen. No one will be able to simply remain on the sidelines, waiting for the storm to pass.

What the Monroe Doctrine is

The Monroe Doctrine (1823) constitutes a proclamation of US foreign policy, named after the fifth American president, Monroe, establishing the principle of mutual non-interference between the New World and the Old World ("America for the Americans"). The Monroe Doctrine as a promise: under the slogan "America for the Americans," "Uncle Sam" would protect his neighbors in the Western Hemisphere from European colonizers. It defined North and South America as a sphere of exclusive US interests, forbidding Europeans from interfering in American affairs, while simultaneously guaranteeing that the US would not interfere in European affairs. The isolationist policy pursued by Trump, and through him the new US technocratic elite (the "right wing of Silicon Valley"), essentially constitutes a modern reissue of this doctrine, which could be termed the "Trump Doctrine" and entails the removal of extra-regional competitors, primarily China and Russia, from the Western Hemisphere, alongside the creation of a technological "mega-complex" under American dominance stretching from the Arctic to Antarctica.

The US plan

The United States seeks to establish an exceptionally secure staging base from which it intends to project power to the rest of the world. This approach reflects fundamental principles of military strategy.

1. The Northern Front: Greenland is considered a critical frontier for controlling North Atlantic shipping routes and the abundant resources of the Arctic region. Any attempts by China to gain a foothold there through investments are decisively halted.

2. The Core of the Staging Base: Within the framework of "Project 2025", the US is restructuring supply chains, relocating critical manufacturing activities from Asia to friendly nations in Latin America. The hemisphere is being transformed into a single trade and resource bloc, with the US returning to the role of "regional policeman." The operation aimed at removing Maduro constitutes a characteristic example of this doctrine's application.

3. The Southern Front: Claims in Antarctica. Proponents of this doctrine favor revising the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and asserting claims over Marie Byrd Land, a vast expanse (approximately 1.6 million square kilometers) that remains the only part of Antarctica not officially claimed by any state. Control of this region would effectively neutralize Chinese and Russian scientific, and potentially military, outposts near the South Pole.

Why did Russia reach the point of facing pressure?

1. Relying on the loyalty of "elites" at the expense of interacting with society ("humanitarian blindness"). For decades, Russian diplomacy followed a strictly bureaucratic approach. Substantive relationships were built on a personal level, centered on incumbent heads of state or narrow ruling circles. Civil society, credible expert centers, youth, and independent media in these countries were completely ignored, while the growth of "pro-Russian" sentiment was actively stifled. As a result, whenever a transfer of power, a coup, or a "color revolution" occurred in a republic, all previous agreements were annulled. The new generation of politicians, having been shaped in complete isolation from the Russian context, proved aligned with the West. Simultaneously, Western foundations (such as USAID and NED) pursued a long-term strategy, cultivating a new, anti-Russian identity among the youth.

2. Economic subsidies without political conditions ("patronage relations via natural gas"). For years, Russia applied a strategy of "buying loyalty" through discounted energy prices, opening its domestic market to foreign products and labor from abroad, providing direct loans, and turning a blind eye to local corruption, all under the belief that the elites' desire to preserve this status quo would act as a guarantee for existing agreements. This approach failed to secure any commitments from the states. Consequently, post-Soviet republics began taking Russian financial accommodations for granted, while using the saved resources to diversify their relations with the West and China. The principle of "separating economics from politics" allowed local elites to promote "de-Russification" while continuing to profit from transit fees and Russian energy resources.

3. Ideological vacuum and absence of an attractive vision for the future. Russia failed to offer former Soviet republics a cohesive model of joint development. The full rollout of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Customs Union was interrupted by the Maidan events in Ukraine. Efforts to draw support exclusively from a shared Soviet past, victory in World War II, and historical memory became increasingly ineffective as new generations emerged. The West, conversely, projected an attractive (albeit deceptive) triptych: "democracy, high standard of living, and rule of law." Russia countered this with a conservative status quo. Consequently, Russia was often perceived as a regressive force attempting to keep other societies anchored to the past.

4. Underestimation of "soft power" dynamics and passivity in the media sector. Russian presence abroad, at the informational and cultural level, remained bureaucratic and ineffective. As a result, Russian-language schools closed even in regions with significant Russian military and economic presence; the role of the Russian language receded, while Russian cultural centers operated on outdated, bureaucratic models often prone to corruption. The information space in post-Soviet republics was essentially ceded, without a fight, to local nationalist media and Western media. This reinforced a stereotype presenting Russia exclusively as an "occupier" and "colonizer."

5. Lack of flexibility and adoption of a reactive rather than proactive stance. For a long time, Russian foreign policy was limited to reacting to crises only after they had already erupted (as in the case of Maidan in Ukraine, coups, or shifts in geopolitical orientation), relying on the hope that things "would pass on their own," rather than shaping developments to prevent such crises from emerging in the first place. A differentiated approach was absent: identical templates were applied to industrial Belarus and the war-torn South Caucasus as to agricultural Moldova or Central Asia, where clan structures dominate.

Conclusion

Russia is following a road of no return. Russia cannot stop unless it fully controls Ukraine, because otherwise, if it accepts a compromise, it would be tantamount to accepting that the West is superior, which is not true. We are experiencing a geopolitical upheaval of historic proportions in the world, and this will not end now; it will take years. The Ukrainian issue will be resolved on the Battlefield, not through Diplomacy.

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