Greece a pawn in the dangerous nuclear games of paranoid Macron – Russia: Ruin for anyone who enters France’s umbrella

The dominant Russian response is not that the French nuclear umbrella is directly dangerous due to its power, but that:

• It is a political attempt by Emmanuel Macron to upgrade France's role in Europe,

• It cannot fully replace the US,

• And if it is accompanied by the deployment of French nuclear assets in countries such as Germany or Poland, it will lead to a new Russia–Europe confrontation and a revision of the Russian defense doctrine.

Countries under protection

The latest participant in Macron’s nuclear paranoia is Norway. As the ninth European state, the Scandinavian country has been seeking since this week to be placed under the protection of the French nuclear umbrella. Among them are also Poland and Lithuania, countries that directly border the threatening neighbor, Russia. Germany is also participating: although the German government continues to rely primarily on the nuclear defense of the United States, it views the French proposal as a welcome opportunity to strengthen deterrence against Russia regardless of American President Donald Trump. In March, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron created a "nuclear steering group" to examine the details of the cooperation.

According to information from SPIEGEL (in its article on Saturday 5/30), Chancellor Friedrich Merz's security advisor, Günter Sautter, traveled to Paris on Wednesday (5/27) for a first round of talks, while other European states also participated in the consultations. The next German-French meeting is scheduled to take place in Germany before the summer break.

The... attack from Russia on Europe

"If you want to be free, you must be feared," Macron often repeats, inspired by the anti-Russian hysteria that seeks to destroy the post-war security doctrine. The head of the French state sees an opportunity for France within the radically changing security situation on the European continent. At a time when Russia is considered to have attacked Europe through Ukraine and the United States has turned into a factor of geopolitical uncertainty under Trump, Macron offers his neighbors the protection of the French "force de frappe" (nuclear deterrent force). Europeans are gradually and gratefully accepting his offer - without, however, calculating the response.

An attack against Germany or other European partners could in the future trigger a nuclear response from the new protective power, France.

The slogan of strategic autonomy and the rejection by Merkel

Macron will leave power in less than a year, but from the first day of his term in 2017, he has set the "strategic autonomy" of Europe as a motto. For a long time, his calls for greater independence from the US were ignored, especially in Germany, where former Chancellor Angela Merkel (who has lived through the nuclear nightmare of the Cold War) had rejected Macron's early nuclear proposals – apparently out of fear of causing dissatisfaction in Washington.

"Forward Deterrence" is what Macron calls the plan he presented in the spring, with a nuclear-powered submarine at the Île Longue military base in Brittany as a backdrop. There, he announced the strengthening of the French nuclear arsenal and even spoke of a new era of nuclear weapons. Things are now moving. However, it remains unclear where exactly this development will lead and in what specific way French protection will be provided.

The French nuclear arsenal

According to experts from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, France currently possesses 290 operational nuclear warheads, before the planned increase of its arsenal. This number seems limited compared to the approximately 3,700 nuclear warheads of the United States or the 4,400 of Russia. However, French nuclear weapons include long-range ballistic missiles launched from submarines. Four nuclear submarines are each equipped with 16 M51 missiles, which have a range of over 10,000 kilometers. Each missile can carry up to six nuclear warheads. According to Macron, the destructive power of each of these submarines is equivalent to the sum of all the bombs dropped on Europe during World War II. In other words, this is considered sufficient to deter any opponent. France also possesses nuclear cruise missiles that can be launched from Rafale fighter jets. These aircraft are stationed at three air bases, including the Saint-Dizier base in eastern France. A second base will soon be added, Luxeuil, which is located even closer to the German border. Furthermore, nuclear-equipped Rafales also operate from the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle. In this way, France maintains the capability to launch a nuclear strike on almost any point on the planet. The aircraft carrier is to be replaced at the end of the 2030s by a new ship, while Macron has already ordered the construction of new nuclear submarines.

What exactly does the French nuclear umbrella offer?

With the concept of "forward deterrence," Macron hinted that "components of strategic armed forces" could be deployed in Europe. However, it is clear from French government sources what this proposal does not mean. The permanent installation of French nuclear weapons in other European states is not provided for. Also, France does not plan to implement a system similar to the so-called "nuclear sharing" of NATO, through which American nuclear weapons are stored in European countries and could be used by allies under specific conditions. The final authority remains exclusively in Paris. It is considered more realistic that European countries provide support to French nuclear forces through military infrastructure, airport access, overflight rights, or in-flight refueling capabilities. In the spring, France sent nuclear-capable Rafales to Poland as a message to Vladimir Putin, following repeated violations of Polish airspace by Russian drones and missiles.

The Bundeswehr participates in nuclear exercises

The Franco-German nuclear coordination group is now planning specific forms of cooperation. According to information from SPIEGEL, joint crisis simulation exercises and closer cooperation between military staffs are provided for. The Bundeswehr will be able to participate in the conventional part of French nuclear exercises and gain access to French nuclear facilities. The first participation of German forces in the "Poker" exercise is expected within the year, probably in September. The "Poker" exercise is the most important annual exercise of the French nuclear forces. Initially, the participation of the Germans will be limited to the role of an observer. Later, however, the Bundeswehr could take on support tasks, such as escorting fighter jets or providing aerial refueling.

Everything depends on the President of France

Despite the closer cooperation, the fundamental principles of French nuclear strategy are not changing. France insists that the use of nuclear weapons is an exclusive privilege of the head of the French state. The President of the Republic retains absolute control over the nuclear arsenal and only he can order its use. "There will be no kind of co-management of the decision," Paris states. "Neither in the planning nor in the execution of a nuclear mission will there be participation of other states." At the same time, France continues to refuse to integrate its nuclear arsenal into the integrated nuclear doctrine of NATO. This means that European countries seeking protection do not acquire real control or a right of co-decision. In practice, they depend on the political will and the judgment of the respective French president.

Who will fund nuclear deterrence?

It also remains unclear who will fund French nuclear expansion. France is already facing serious fiscal problems. Its public debt is at historical highs, while the maintenance and modernization of nuclear forces already absorb a significant part of the defense budget. Paris, however, assures that the funding of nuclear deterrence is a national responsibility of France. European partners are mainly expected to increase their spending on conventional military capabilities.

The great uncertainty of European deterrence

For Germany and the other countries seeking to join under the French nuclear umbrella, the basic problem remains unsolved: France offers protection, but not participation in decision-making. Unlike the NATO nuclear deterrence system, where there are joint consultation and planning processes between allies, the French nuclear force remains absolutely national. Therefore, even if a country like Germany invests politically and militarily in French deterrence, it will have no institutional right to influence the final decision on the use of nuclear weapons. This decision will continue to be taken exclusively by the President of the French Republic. And so remains the critical question that worries many Europeans today: In a world of increasing uncertainty, which nuclear umbrella is ultimately more reliable? The American one, which depends on the choices of an unpredictable Donald Trump? Or the French one, which depends on the decisions of a future president in Paris — perhaps even a government of the National Rally? Even supporters of European strategic autonomy admit that the answer to this question remains open. France undoubtedly possesses a strong and reliable nuclear force. But the trust of European partners does not depend only on missiles, submarines, and aircraft. It also depends on who will ultimately hold the hand on the nuclear button.

Secrecy and operational limits

In a speech on March 2, French President Emmanuel Macron stated that Paris intends to increase the size of its nuclear arsenal. At the same time, however, France will no longer publicize the exact size of this arsenal. As a result, the true extent of the planned increase remains unknown. The official explanation for this new secrecy is the desire to "prevent speculation." This argument is somewhat paradoxical. When official information disappears, speculation inevitably becomes the only basis for public discussion. A more persuasive explanation is that Paris wishes to conceal the limited scope of any increase in the arsenal in the coming years. The reality is that France currently has no practical means to significantly increase the number of deployed nuclear vectors.

The two pillars of French nuclear deterrence

French nuclear deterrence is based on two pillars. The first consists of four Triomphant-class nuclear-powered submarines, each of which can carry 16 M51 intercontinental ballistic missiles. The second is the aerial component: Rafale fighter jets equipped to carry ASMPA supersonic cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. The exact number of these air-launched missiles is not publicly known. However, it is estimated that there are about 40 in total, including those used for tests and training. The ASMPA missiles have not been produced for some time. Instead, existing missiles are being upgraded to the ASMPA-R version, which has a modernized nuclear warhead. The production of submarine-launched M51 missiles continues normally and the development of the newer M51.3 version, which has improved range and increased anti-missile defense penetration capabilities, has already begun. However, none of this increases the number of launch vehicles. France cannot simply create extra submarines or aircraft out of thin air. The fleet remains the same and the same applies to the number of deployed launchers.

How could the arsenal be expanded?

In the short term, the only way France could increase the number of deployed nuclear warheads is to place more warheads on the already existing missiles of its submarines. Today, many missiles carry fewer warheads than their maximum capacity. This configuration increases range and facilitates the penetration of anti-missile defense systems. Similar flexibility is used by all major nuclear powers, including Russia and the United States. For strikes against individual targets, it is often preferable to have missiles with a smaller payload ready for use. However, even this option has limits. At any given time, one of the four French submarines is in the process of maintenance. This significantly limits the operational flexibility of the French nuclear fleet. Overall, these limitations suggest that France could realistically add only a few dozen additional nuclear warheads in the coming years. Given that the current arsenal is estimated at about 300 nuclear warheads — including both naval and air weapons — the short-term increase will likely not exceed two or three dozen warheads.

Future French nuclear systems

In the long term, however, France plans to introduce a new generation of nuclear weapon carriers, which could allow for a more significant increase in the arsenal. Macron referred to these future capabilities during his speech. He spoke of the first submarine of a new class, known to date as SNLE-3G, which will bear the name L’Invincible. According to the current plan, this submarine will join the operational planning in 2036. At the same time, new air-launched nuclear weapons are being developed. The ASN4G hypersonic missile program aims to create a new generation of air-to-ground nuclear missiles. These missiles are expected to appear several years before the new submarines. Initially, they will be carried by upgraded versions of the Rafale.

Promotion of French nuclear forces in Europe

In a longer-term horizon, France plans to prepare the necessary infrastructure for the rapid dispersal and promotion of its aerial nuclear forces throughout Europe in the event of a crisis. This will include:

• The selection of air bases in allied countries,

• The planning of the deployment of French nuclear units outside France,

• And the determination of ways of their cooperation with local armed forces.

Germany as a key partner

Germany is considered the most important partner in this effort. Among the other countries mentioned are:

• Poland,

• The Netherlands,

• Belgium,

• Greece,

• Sweden,

• And Denmark. A joint statement issued together with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz confirms that Germany will participate in French nuclear exercises within the current year. In the context of these exercises, German fighter jets are expected to train in the mission of escorting French Rafales.

Additional measures

Beyond the exercises, other cooperation measures are being considered. Among these are:

• The development of air and missile defense systems to protect French nuclear forces when they operate abroad,

• As well as the creation of a joint missile attack warning system. The latter will likely rely heavily on French technologies and infrastructure.

A smaller-scale European nuclear sharing?

It remains uncertain whether all these plans will be implemented. In essence, France is proposing something that vaguely resembles the nuclear sharing system of NATO, but on a smaller scale and with greater emphasis on advanced technology. Macron has emphasized that these initiatives are not intended to replace the existing nuclear guarantees of NATO, which rely primarily on the United States. Washington has been informed about the discussions, although a negative reaction from the US could hardly be considered unlikely.

The reaction of the United States and Russian concerns

Russia warned that any European countries that accept the deployment of French strategic bombers with nuclear capability will become targets of attack by Russian forces in the event of a conflict. As the spokesperson for the Russian president, Dmitry Peskov, pointed out, the very fact that France and Germany are discussing nuclear cooperation shows that negotiations on strategic stability can no longer be conducted exclusively between Moscow and Washington. The geographical expansion of Western nuclear infrastructure throughout Europe — and especially in countries such as Sweden, Denmark, and Poland — is inevitable to cause concern in Moscow. These areas are much closer to the Russian border compared to the locations where American nuclear weapons had been deployed in the past. From a Russian perspective, the transfer of critical strategic infrastructure towards northern and eastern Europe alters the strategic security environment and creates new challenges for Russian defense planning. There is, however, a factor that may mitigate these concerns. Large-scale pan-European defense and military programs have a long history of ambitious announcements, but a much shorter history of successful implementation. In Europe, plans for common weapon systems, common military structures, and unified defense initiatives have been presented repeatedly, many of which were significantly delayed or never implemented to the extent that was originally announced.

Overestimation of forces

For the time being, French nuclear ambitions seem to fall into this familiar category. Despite the ambitious statements of Emmanuel Macron, the real increase of the French nuclear arsenal is expected to be limited in the coming years. France still does not possess new launch vehicles, new submarines, or new aerial platforms that can drastically alter the balance of power. At the same time, plans for a wider European nuclear cooperation remain at an early stage and are still far from forming a comprehensive European nuclear deterrence system. In other words, France seeks to strengthen its strategic role in Europe and upgrade its position as the continent's nuclear power. However, for the moment, the distance between political ambitions and real military capabilities remains significant.