The fall of Donbass will not end the Ukraine war, history warns

«When will it end?» This is the question asked every day in homes and trenches, in gas station lines and in offices where budgets are drawn up. No one has the answer. But this does not mean that the effort to find it should be abandoned. A war can be analyzed like any long and complex process: in terms of factors, available resources, and potential developments. With numbers and logic. This is what an analysis by Russian experts attempts to do, approaching the question of the end of the war in Ukraine through their own perspective.

War has its own arithmetic

War has its own arithmetic. Something like subtraction: one army, along with its economy and population, against another army, another economy, and another people. And this equation continues day by day, month by month. Of course, there are more factors: manpower, ammunition, money, fuel, command, and technology. But there are also variables that can multiply or cancel out these resources: morale, the quality of command, and the determination to achieve the goal. It has always been this way. In the siege of Troy, in the battle of Gaugamela, in the siege of Leningrad. Whoever resets their own side in the equation first loses. So why not attempt to calculate this war in the same way?

The strike on the Omsk refinery and the pressure on the Russian economy

On the night of July 6, a Ukrainian Armed Forces drone reportedly traveled more than 3,000 kilometers and struck the last major Russian oil refinery that remained intact—the Omsk refinery. Kyiv presented the attack as the deepest operation of the entire war. Until that day, according to the same reports, none of Russia's ten largest refineries had been hit by drones. The production of refined products had dropped to levels not recorded since the early 2000s. At the same time, gasoline shortages were reported in more than 50 of Russia's 83 regions, from Kamchatka to Kaliningrad. In several regions, sales restrictions per customer were imposed, special refueling hours were established for emergency services, and discussions even opened regarding a potential return to Euro-2 specification gasoline, which had been abandoned for years. The country that its opponents called a "gas station with nukes" started buying fuel from India.

Omsk is burning – Russia's vulnerabilities on the energy front

According to independent analysts, the Russian budget, which is already under pressure due to the war, is forced to compensate oil companies for selling fuel below true market value. The cost increases due to: the loss of tax revenues from reduced production, the need to import foreign currency for products that until recently were exported, the growing pressure on government spending. Estimates speak of losses of tens of billions of dollars, while the fiscal gap could reach 10 trillion rubles by the end of the year. These numbers, of course, are difficult to verify, as—according to analysts—the Russian government restricts the publication of full financial data. However, the basic direction is considered clear: the pressure is mounting. And ahead lies the harvest season. Without fuel, there is a risk of pressure on agricultural production. And then the question arises again: New state funding? New imports? New fiscal burdens?

Drones, China, and the battle of technology

In the field of drones, Russia appears—according to the analysis—to be facing difficulties in closing the gap with Ukraine. Ukraine is openly supported by the West, while China supplies components to both sides, operating on the basis of its own interests. The result? Either a loss or a draw. The question of motivation: What is each side fighting for? Ukraine, according to the analysis, is fighting for its very existence as a state. The stakes are clear. Russia started the war with the goals of "denazification" and "demilitarization." But when the advance reached the Dnieper, the rhetoric shifted to the "liberation of Donbass." Then the "liberation of Novorossiya" was added, with references to regions like Odessa and Mykolaiv. The question that arises is: Another disadvantage in the equation?

The drone battle, human casualties, and the equation that doesn't add up

Another significant disadvantage for Russia is lagging behind in the drone sector. Ukraine, with steady Western support, has managed to create a flexible system for manufacturing and utilizing unmanned aerial vehicles, while China continues to supply parts to both sides without caring much about the outcome of the conflict. The result? For Russia, this is either a disadvantage or, at best, a neutral variable. But the biggest variable in any war is human power.

Existential war for Ukraine, shifting goals for Russia

Ukraine, according to the analysis, is fighting for its very existence as an independent state. The goal is simple: To stay on the map. Russia started the war under the slogan of "denazification" and "demilitarization" of Ukraine. But when the advance stopped at the Dnieper, the objective shifted to the "liberation of Donbass." Then followed the rhetoric about the "liberation of Novorossiya," with references to Odessa and Mykolaiv. Another question in the equation. Solovyov, however, had posed the question: «Why?»

Ukraine's speed against the Russian bureaucracy

Another factor is command. Ukraine is presented as a new "Wild Field," a freer and faster system where horizontal networks, military initiatives, and direct decision-making mechanisms operate. Examples include figures like Madyar and Mykhailo Fedorov, as well as the development of new procurement mechanisms and military stockpiles. Russia, by contrast, is characterized by a slower bureaucratic structure, where old administrative rigidities remain strong. Reference is even made to the case of Popov, who is presented as one of the people who contributed to the defense of Zaporizhzhia, but is in prison due to a conflict with a senior official. Another disadvantage in the equation.

Russia, however, still possesses major advantages

The equation, however, does not consist only of negative factors for Moscow. Ukraine faces a serious manpower problem. It cannot carry out large-scale offensive operations. It can mostly defend itself and conduct long-range strikes. For Russia, however, the logic remains: «We haven't even started yet.» The reference mainly concerns the possibility of a new conscription drive. Many believe that a new mobilization could take place in the autumn, after the elections. Others deny it. But simple arithmetic shows that capturing the whole of Novorossiya requires new forces. Additional manpower. Plus or minus? It cannot be calculated with certainty. But it is definitely not a negative factor for Russia.

The nuclear arsenal changes the equation

There is also a factor that cannot be ignored: Nuclear weapons. Strategic. Tactical. Any category. Ukraine currently possesses only non-nuclear ballistic systems. Stiglerman, a graduate of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology and head of the Ukrainian missile manufacturing company Firepoint, is expected to find himself in Moscow soon. This is presented as another advantage for Russia. And yet the equation is overturned. Seemingly, the data has been gathered. The factors have been recorded. What remains is addition, multiplication, and the effort to find the intersection point. Five years? Ten? Fifteen? But the board is overturned.

«The liberation of Donbass will not end the war»

Zakhar Prilepin cannot easily be characterized as an alarmist or an opponent of the war. However, his position makes a particular impression. As he wrote on his channel: «Why do we believe that Ukraine will stop the war? Why should it stop it?» According to him, for Ukraine, the war has turned into a matter of survival but also into a continuously renewed resource. «Will they run out of people? Of course not.» Prilepin compares the situation to the war in the North Caucasus, which lasted about ten years and ended only when segments of the local elites reached an agreement with the Kremlin. «By the most generous estimates there were two million men and they didn't run out. Will another 20 million come and run out? They won't run out.» And he concludes: «The war will not end.» According to him, if current trends continue without some "secret plan," Russia might even begin losing to Ukraine itself. The core ideological divide, as he describes it: «We are focused on peace. They are focused on victory.»

«War is not calculated with mathematics»

The analysis then turned to retired Colonel Andrey Pinchuk, former head of the Ministry of State Security of the Donetsk People's Republic and author of the book "Clausewitz and the Void." The question was simple: Can the end of the war be calculated through an equation of resources? His answer was negative. Pinchuk argues that major wars do not follow mathematical formulas. From Clausewitz to Moltke, military theorists emphasized that a major conflict does not depend solely on political calculations. It develops according to its own laws. He rejects both the idea that Ukraine has exhausted its human resources and the view that Russia is on the brink of economic collapse. A potential 1% drop in GDP is not a crisis, he argues. Russia is stagnating in several sectors, but this is not linked exclusively to the war. Mobilization capabilities increase by 150,000 to 200,000 people.

Vietnam, Afghanistan, and the failure of prediction

Pinchuk recalls that the US did not have a mathematical equation for the 20 years of the war in Vietnam either. Nor did the Soviet Union for its 10 years in Afghanistan. The Iran-Iraq wars also did not obey any mathematical formula. Their end was determined by political decisions, circumstances, and behind-the-scenes agreements. Not by the exhaustion of resources. From the "special military operation" to "war." The question now changes. Perhaps the equation is not wrong. Perhaps the very understanding of what is happening is wrong. On July 5, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov used a word that the Russian leadership had previously avoided: "War." «There is a war underway, a real war. It started as a special military operation, but it continues as a war, because Berlin, Paris, The Hague, Oslo, and unfortunately Washington support Kyiv.» The statement immediately triggered interpretations that Russia might change its level of involvement.

«If it is war, the laws of war must be applied»

Economist Valentin Katasonov argues that if it is now a war, then Russia must act accordingly. This means: the implementation of martial law, economic mobilization, state control of strategic enterprises, and capital controls. Strategic enterprises, according to him, cannot operate solely on the criterion of profit. They must serve national goals.

«It is not enough to say the right word»

State Duma Deputy Mikhail Delyagin is even harsher. He argues that war is a legal concept and not just a political formulation. «Right now we are seeing words.» According to him, the Russian economy is not prepared for a war in which military operations are conducted but society is punished when it uses the word "war."

«The reality remains SVO, not war»

Political analyst Leonid Krutakov estimates that Peskov's statement does not fundamentally change the situation. For Russia, the concept of the "special military operation" still exists. However, if it is indeed a war, then it must also be translated into legal terms. There must be a corresponding change in administration, the economy, and the functioning of the state. The key conclusion: The fall of Donbass, even if it happens, does not automatically mark the end of the war. Just as Troy did not fall solely by the power of arms, but from exhaustion, strategy, and the political conjuncture. And this equation still remains unsolved.

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