Today's US–China competition differs fundamentally from the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.
As the United States is increasingly viewed as an unreliable partner, middle powers are taking a leading role, actively promoting their own agendas and shaping the future of the international system.
From the unipolar moment to an unstable transition
Over the last decade, US-led unipolarity has been gradually receding, giving way to a new international system that combines elements of US–China bipolarity and multipolarity. According to Modern Diplomacy, this transition was accelerated by the United States withdrawing from its traditional leadership role during the presidency of Donald J. Trump, as well as by the weakening of international norms—due both to the US capture of Nicolas Maduro and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The instability of today’s global order has allowed several middle powers—including Indonesia, Brazil, Turkey, and Vietnam—to gain greater influence than ever before. Exploiting the fluid international environment, they promote their own interests, increase their strategic autonomy, and attempt to set the rules in their respective regions.
A new competition, not a new Cold War
Today's US–China competition differs fundamentally from the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. First, it is not characterized by the same ideological tensions that in the past pushed governments to openly side with one superpower or the other. Second, China actively participates in and has significantly benefited from the liberal international system created by the US after World War II—a system that the United States itself, under Donald Trump, is now undermining. Third, while the Soviet Union primarily threatened the US militarily, China constitutes both a military and an economic threat. Finally, all this has led to deep economic interdependence between China, the United States, and their allies. At the same time, the very nature of middle powers has changed. Today, they maintain functional relationships with both the US and China, possess stronger industrial bases, and carry greater economic and military weight than in the past. The demographic and economic trends of the 21st century have allowed them to further strengthen their power and autonomy against traditional great powers.
The art of strategic balance
All these factors have allowed middle powers to adopt a more transactional and pragmatic approach in their relations with the two superpowers. They seek positive and functional relationships with both the United States and China, without restricting their strategic autonomy through excessive attachment to either. As long as the benefits of this "balance" outweigh the costs, middle powers will continue to leverage their independence for the benefit of their own interests, seeking to maintain as much distance as possible from both Washington and Beijing. Even traditional US allies have moved against American interests when they judged that it better served their own needs. US allies maintain extensive trade relations with China for economic gain, while South Korea is considered an uncertain partner in the event of a potential military conflict over Taiwan.
This trend is characteristically reflected in Turkey, a NATO member since 1952, which has seen its relations with the West deteriorate while simultaneously moving against Western interests by importing Russian oil and delaying the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO. India, despite competing with China and cooperating with the US on security issues—such as through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—does not follow the same line regarding Russia, from which it imports large quantities of energy and weapons systems. As the United States is viewed as an increasingly unreliable partner, middle powers are also taking initiatives to promote their own regional agendas. This manifests sometimes through the strengthening of multilateralism and the shaping of new rules—such as when Japan took a leading role in saving the Trans-Pacific Partnership after the US withdrawal in 2017—and at other times through direct action, such as Poland taking a leading role in military support for Ukraine.
Turkey: A model of strategic autonomy
Turkey constitutes a prime example of a modern middle power. During the Cold War, under the direct threat of the Soviet Union, it was a steadfast ally of the United States, hosting American missiles, joining NATO, and sending troops to the Korean War. Today, Turkey remains a member of NATO and depends heavily on Western capital for financing and investment. However, its geopolitical environment has changed radically since the end of the Cold War. No longer threatened by a hostile superpower on its borders, it does not depend to the same degree on the West for its security, while it has grown in population, economy, and industry.
This has allowed it to pursue a much more independent foreign policy, often reaching the limits of conflict with its formal allies. It opposed American support for the Kurds in Iraq and Syria, purchased the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft system in 2017, and, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, used the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO as a bargaining chip to extract concessions from the West. Turkey's increased strategic autonomy has also allowed it to play the role of mediator in modern conflicts, as seen with the Black Sea Grain Initiative and Trump's peace plan for Gaza. At the same time, it leverages its economic and industrial power to expand its influence in what it considers its natural neighborhood: the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. It has become militarily involved in Syria, Iraq, and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, while investing particularly in the Syrian war, hosting millions of refugees and funding the opposition forces that eventually overthrew the Assad regime.
The inevitable path toward a multipolar world
Even if the trend of American isolationism is reversed, the global transition toward greater multipolarity at the expense of American hegemony—and the structural forces driving it—will not be halted. The current actions of middle powers offer a clear picture of the world taking shape. As the international system becomes increasingly unpredictable and fragmented, middle powers will continue to seek stability and cohesion for themselves where it serves their interests. The world will no longer be defined by American hegemony or by rival blocs as in the Cold War. Instead, regional balances will be increasingly shaped by middle powers filling the vacuum of a relatively weaker and withdrawing America, according to their own interests.
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