The policy of exclusion: US control in Venezuela strangles China's oil artery

Through a naval blockade, tanker seizures, and direct control of flows, Washington is transforming oil into a weapon of power, cutting off China's vital supply from Venezuela. China's oil imports from Venezuela are expected to decline sharply starting in February as US enforcement measures disrupt crude shipments, according to Reuters.

The downturn follows Washington's December announcement of a naval blockade on vessels transporting Venezuelan oil. This was part of a broader pressure campaign against President Nicolás Maduro, which culminated in a US military operation leading to his capture on January 3, 2026.

Following the operation, US President Donald Trump stated that the United States now exercises control over Venezuela, a founding member of OPEC, and called on American companies to return to the country's energy sector. Since then, the US has seized five ships linked to exports of Venezuelan crude, sending a deterrent shock through the shipping industry and restricting oil flows to Venezuela’s largest customer, China.

Disruption in oil shipments

The blockade has drastically reduced the number of tankers departing from Venezuela destined for Asia. Many shipowners have either changed course or returned to the country's territorial waters after loading to avoid the risk of seizure. Although about a dozen tankers initially set sail with their transponders turned off during the US raid on January 3, most later reversed course following negotiations between the transitional authorities in Caracas and Washington for a supply deal of 50 million barrels of oil.

Only three tankers, carrying a total of about five million barrels of fuel oil and Merey heavy crude, continue their journey to China and are expected to arrive by late February. This volume corresponds to approximately 166,000 barrels per day, far below the average of Venezuelan exports to China in 2025, which stood at 642,000 barrels per day and represented nearly three-quarters of the country's total crude and fuel oil exports.

China's stockpiles and market response

Despite the decrease in arrivals, China does not face immediate supply pressure. Large quantities of Venezuelan crude were stored in late 2025, while tens of millions of barrels remain at sea. Estimates from ship tracking systems show that between 43 and 52 million barrels of Venezuelan oil are currently heading east.

Chinese imports peaked at a historical high of 660,000 barrels per day in November before subsiding to approximately 450,000 barrels per day in December as available storage capacity was limited. This "cushion" allows Chinese refineries to delay the search for alternative supplies, at least in the short term.

Blow to independent refiners (teapots)

The disruption in supply is expected to disproportionately hit China's independent refiners, known as “teapots,” who have been the primary buyers of Venezuela's heavy crude. These refineries mainly process Merey and fuel oil to produce asphalt used in road construction.

Although Venezuelan oil accounts for only 4% of China's total seaborne oil imports, its importance to the teapots is much greater. Some refineries still have cargoes scheduled for March and April that set sail before the blockade; however, availability beyond the first quarter remains uncertain. For the second quarter, teapots may turn to alternatives such as Canada's Cold Lake or Access Western Blend, especially if Venezuelan barrels are redirected to the US market under American supervision.

Geopolitical and economic consequences

On a geopolitical level, the blockade marks a decisive shift in US strategy, from mere sanctions enforcement to direct control of energy flows. By restricting Venezuela's exports to China, Washington is using oil as a tool of geostrategy, reshaping trade routes, influencing market behavior, and limiting Beijing's efforts for energy diversification.

Economically, the upheaval introduces volatility into the heavy crude markets, potentially to the benefit of alternative suppliers like Canada. For China, the episode highlights the vulnerability of relying on sanctioned producers and the limits of bypass practices, such as "renaming" Venezuelan crude as Malaysian or Brazilian.

From a geopolitical perspective, this development demonstrates the changing nature of energy geopolitics in a multipolar world. Controlling production alone is no longer enough; dominance in shipping, insurance, and maritime rule enforcement has become equally critical.

The American blockade shows how naval power and financial jurisdiction can be utilized to rearrange global energy flows without a formal revision of trade rules. For China, the situation reinforces the strategic importance of stockpiling, diversification, and land-based energy corridors that reduce exposure to maritime choke points and US enforcement mechanisms.

In the long run, the prolonged obstruction of the Venezuela–China oil trade may accelerate Chinese investments in alternative heavy crude suppliers and further strengthen the pursuit of energy security beyond maritime routes.

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