For years, Aleksandar Vučić and Viktor Orbán were considered by their political opponents to be the strongest exponents of the so-called "illiberal model" of governance in Europe. Both built political careers by challenging traditional centers of power, clashed with European institutions, and frequently adopted rhetoric reminiscent of Donald Trump, particularly on issues concerning the "deep state," the media, and political elites. That is why many expected that, should they lose power, they would follow the same path Trump took after the US elections. It did not happen. And that is precisely what The New York Times are now attempting to explain.
The question posed by the American newspaper
In its extensive analysis, the American newspaper attempts to answer a question troubling both Brussels and Washington: Why did Vučić and Orbán choose to recognize their defeat instead of challenging the results? The question acquires particular interest because both leaders had been repeatedly accused by opponents and Western media of concentrating excessive power and creating political systems tailored to their own needs. Nevertheless, when faced with the prospect of losing power, they did not choose head-on collision, defining illiberal model governance.
Christopher Hill's theory
The interpretation offered by former US Ambassador to Belgrade, Christopher Hill, presents particular interest. According to him, Vučić realized very quickly that election data left little room for dispute. In his assessment, the former Serbian president did not seriously consider any scenario of institutional clash or attempt to overturn the outcome. On the contrary, he preferred to invest in a different strategy: a strategy of waiting. Hill considers that Vučić is betting on the fact that the heterogeneous and multi-layered "Student Alliance," which managed to defeat the previous system of power, will struggle to maintain its cohesion. In other words, Vučić is not fighting the battle today because he believes he will have better chances tomorrow, influencing Balkan political strategy.
The "Terminator strategy"
Precisely for this reason, the former US diplomat used an unusual parallel. He described Vučić's stance as the "Terminator strategy." The political message is summarized in three words: I'll be back. "I will return." The logic is simple: A politician who believes the new governing coalition will wear down quickly does not need to fight the final battle on the night of defeat. He simply needs to wait, to play the "long game," the game of patience. This approach differs radically from the Trump model, where challenging the outcome became an immediate and central political tool, shaping Serbian election outcome.
The Brussels factor
The New York Times identify a second factor as well: The European Union. According to the analysis, Brussels has acquired far greater influence over states in Central and Southeastern Europe through funding, development programs, and financial support. This means that even politicians appearing confrontational toward the EU know there are limits that can hardly be exceeded without cost. European funding is now increasingly linked to adherence to democratic procedures and institutional normality. According to the American newspaper, this fact significantly restricted maneuvering room for both Vučić and Orbán, impacting EU funding conditions.
Vučić's different version
The former president of Serbia himself, however, rejects the view that he was influenced by Western pressure. According to his statements, his choice to concede defeat had nothing to do with interventions by foreign factors. On the contrary, as he maintained, it was based exclusively on electoral data. Vučić described an evening that initially seemed promising for his camp, as early results from rural areas created optimism. However, the picture changed when data began arriving from Belgrade and major urban centers. Then, as he says, it became clear that the math did not add up. And when the math does not add up… no political narrative can alter the outcome, reflecting Belgrade voting results.
The phone call with Orbán
Vučić also revealed that the first foreign leader to contact him after the elections was Viktor Orbán. The conversation took place, according to him, at 11:15 PM on election night. This detail carries particular political interest. The two men have for years been considered political allies, sharing similar views on issues of national sovereignty, migration policy, and relations with Brussels. The simultaneous loss of power by two such powerful figures inevitably generated comparisons, defining European conservative alliances.
The meeting that became a symbol
The most interesting element of the analysis, however, concerns a subsequent meeting. According to The New York Times, Vučić and Orbán met at the home of the former Serbian president's father near Belgrade. There, according to the newspaper's account, the two politicians acknowledged that they had lost power, but not their ambition. The message they wished to send was that electoral defeat does not necessarily equate to political disappearance. Precisely there lies the real reason why The New York Times analysis chose the parallel with the Terminator. Because the essence of the strategy is not found in defeat; it is found in the conviction that defeat is temporary, and that the next political battle has already begun, even if its protagonists are no longer in power, illustrating post-election political movements.
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