The potential 60-day interim agreement between the US and Iran is presented by certain circles as a diplomatic way out. In reality, however, if it is finally achieved, it will not mark the end of the conflict. It will merely constitute a temporary suspension of it. A break between two cycles of crisis. A pause before the next trial. Iran and the US have been trapped for years in a vicious cycle of threats, sanctions, negotiations, deadlocks, and military confrontations. Every time a window of diplomacy seems to open, it remains narrow, fragile, and undermined by American unreliability. And every time talks fail, Washington returns to the familiar language of pressure: sanctions, military threats, blockades, economic strangulation, and indirect or direct military escalation. Today, the possibility of a 60-day interim agreement remains uncertain. There is information that a limited framework is still being discussed, which could provide for a temporary lifting of the naval blockade, the opening of the Straits of Hormuz, a partial release of frozen Iranian assets, and the resumption of nuclear negotiations within a period of 30 to 60 days. If this scenario materializes, we will certainly be talking about a significant tactical de-escalation. But not about strategic peace. On the contrary, it is likely that we will enter a new era: not a real reconciliation between the US and Iran, but a new form of prolonged confrontation. A new Cold War in the Middle East, where diplomacy will function as a temporary brake rather than a definitive solution.
The temporary agreement as recognition of Iran's resilience
The first and most important conclusion is that the very discussion about an interim agreement constitutes an indirect recognition of Iran's resilience. Despite sanctions, economic pressure, military threats, blockades, and attacks, Tehran did not kneel. It did not accept complete submission. It did not abandon its core strategic rights. It did not appear at the negotiation table as a defeated power, but as a state that withstood the pressure and continues to negotiate from a position of dignity. This is the element that bothers Washington the most. The US was accustomed to treating the Middle East as a space for enforcement. A space where sanctions, military bases, alliances, and threats were enough to shape the behavior of states. Iran, however, proved that a state with a strategic culture, regional networks, social resilience, and political will can endure much longer than the planners in Washington calculated. The potential lifting, even if temporary, of a naval blockade, the opening of the Straits of Hormuz, and the release of part of the frozen Iranian assets is not a gift from the US to Iran. It is the result of pressure, cost, and deadlock. It is the admission that without understanding with Tehran, stability in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East cannot be restored.
American diplomacy without credibility
The core problem in any US–Iran negotiation is Washington's credibility. Iran has every reason to view American commitments with suspicion. The history of recent years has shown that the US can sign agreements, instrumentalize them politically, abandon them when the domestic political balance changes, and then blame the other side for the crisis. This is the permanent deadlock of American foreign policy: it demands commitments from others, without offering stability to its own commitments. A 60-day interim agreement can create a breathing space. It can open a channel of communication. It can temporarily limit the risk of direct conflict. But it does not answer the fundamental question: who guarantees that the US will stick to diplomacy when it does not produce the result they want? Experience shows that American policy often moves between two extremes: on the one hand, temporary negotiation, on the other hand, a return to the military threat. This creates an environment in which diplomacy is not a stable resolution process, but a tool for tactical management before the next pressure. For Iran, this means that no agreement can be credible unless it is accompanied by real guarantees, substantial lifting of sanctions, and respect for its sovereignty. At the same time, Tehran is hardening its negotiating line, making it clear that any temporary agreement cannot rely on empty American promises. Ali Bagheri Kani, deputy secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, sent a triple message to Washington: first, that the US cannot be credible, as the violation of commitments is part of the nature of this country, second, that the illegally frozen Iranian assets must be released without conditions and restrictions, and third, that the termination of the war on all fronts, including Lebanon, constitutes a fundamental principle of any negotiation or agreement.
The scenario of the temporary outcome
Richard Fontaine, head of the Center for a New American Security and a well-known analyst of American foreign policy and national security, estimates that a limited 60-day agreement is perhaps the most likely outcome of the current phase of the US–Iran conflict. However, according to this reading, such an agreement will not be a real end. It will be a temporary solution. It will pave the way for new, long, complex, and probably low-yield negotiations, without a clear timeline, without guaranteed success, and without certainty that the US will remain committed to the diplomatic path. This is the critical point. The 60-day agreement will not resolve the confrontation. It will transfer it to another form. From direct conflict to diplomatic waiting. From war to suspension. From a hot crisis to a new Cold War. And this Cold War can be even more dangerous, because it will include all elements of the previous confrontation: sanctions, threats, covert operations, regional pressure, nuclear negotiations without an outcome, and constant preparation for the next conflict.
From the second to the third US-Iran war
If the Richard Fontaine analysis is confirmed, then the region is not heading toward peace, but toward the repetition of a familiar pattern. This pattern has already become apparent: first threats and tension, then the start of negotiations, next a period of suspension with sanctions and deadlocks, and finally a return to military escalation. After the 12-day war and before the start of the 40-day war, US–Iran relations went through four stages: First, threats and tension. From the end of the previous conflict until the start of the talks, the atmosphere was charged with statements, military movements, pressure, and warnings. Second, nuclear negotiations. For a few months, diplomacy seemed to dominate. The two sides were talking, looking for a framework, and attempting to prevent direct conflict. Third, suspension. The talks did not lead to a clear agreement. The sanctions remained. The threats returned. The anticipation of war became part of the political reality. Fourth, war. The conflict broke out again in March 2026. If the same template is repeated, then the 60-day interim agreement may be just the beginning of a new cycle. First there will be a temporary de-escalation. After that, difficult negotiations will begin. Then obstacles, American demands, Israeli pressures, sanctions, ultimatums, and accusations will appear. And in the end, if there is no real political will from Washington, the conflict may return. In other words, the interim agreement may not prevent the third war. It may simply postpone it.
The myth of Sisyphus in US-Iran relations
The image that best describes US–Iran relations is the myth of Sisyphus. The two sides push the same rock again and again toward the top of the mountain: threats, negotiations, temporary agreements, deadlocks, sanctions, suspension, war. And every time the rock seems to be approaching the top, it slips and falls again. The process is repeated almost mechanically. Diplomacy begins with expectations. Then the US demands more. Iran asks for guarantees. The sanctions remain. Israel presses for a harder line. Washington begins talking again about all options on the table. Trust collapses. And the region returns to the brink of conflict. This vicious cycle is not a natural phenomenon. It is a political choice. And the primary responsibility lies with the US, because it is the power that insists on using diplomacy as an extension of pressure and not as a means for an equal solution. Iran, for its part, has proven that it can negotiate. But it cannot accept negotiation under blackmail. It cannot agree while sanctions remain. It cannot trust promises that can be overturned by the next American administration or by the next political crisis in Washington.
The real question: Do the US want an agreement or submission?
The essence of the crisis is condensed into one question: do the US want a real agreement with Iran or do they want the submission of Iran? If they want an agreement, then they must accept that Tehran has rights, interests, security concerns, and a regional role. There must be a substantial lifting of sanctions. Guarantees must be given. The policy of threats must stop. The role of forces seeking permanent conflict must be limited. If, however, the US want submission, then no interim agreement will endure. It will be just another episode in the myth of Sisyphus: the rock will go a little higher and then roll back into the abyss. Iran has shown that it will not accept an agreement of humiliation. And this, ultimately, is the big message of this crisis.
The rock of Sisyphus will roll again
The potential 60-day interim agreement between the US and Iran may temporarily reduce tension. It may open the Straits of Hormuz. It may allow a limited release of Iranian assets. It may bring back nuclear negotiations. But it is not enough. If there is no deeper change in the American approach, the agreement will function as a temporary break before the next round of crisis. The threats will return. The sanctions will remain. The talks will bog down. The suspension will turn into tension again. And the region will find itself facing the danger of a third war. Iran is not at the table because it was defeated. It is at the table because it endured. The US are not negotiating because they suddenly became a power of peace. They are negotiating because the policy of pressure reached its limits. This is the real meaning of the moment. The 60-day agreement, if it exists, will be a test not for Iran, but for the US. It will show whether Washington can abandon the logic of blackmail and accept an equal diplomacy. If not, then the new US–Iran Cold War will have already begun. And the rock of Sisyphus will roll again.
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