China intervened urgently in Iran to ensure that the covert operations of Mossad inside the Islamic Republic would not trigger another collapse of air defense systems and the information domain, similar to what reportedly occurred during the 12 day war in June 2025, according to The Cradle.
Beijing’s intervention against Israeli intelligence activity unfolds across multiple levels, from defense systems to digital security, aiming to integrate allied Iran into a broader security architecture designed to shield the Khamenei government.
Speaking to The Cradle, military experts and intelligence sources increasingly describe Mossad’s deep penetration into Iran as the opening of a “Pandora’s box” with global security risks.
From Beijing’s perspective, intelligence operations conducted by Israel and the United States, which expanded after 2015 and accelerated during 2025–2026, mark the emergence of a new battlespace.
Chinese analysts dissect Mossad methodology in Iran
Mossad’s ability to plant agents, breach sensitive databases, disable radar networks, and facilitate precision strikes from within Iranian territory is interpreted by Chinese analysts as a shift toward what they describe as Informationized and Intelligent Warfare.
This model represents the convergence of cyber sabotage, internal recruitment, technological infiltration, and operational coordination, a hybrid framework in which intelligence services effectively neutralize defensive infrastructure before kinetic operations even begin.
For China, the implications extend far beyond Iran.
Information warfare as a precursor to total conflict
Within Chinese security discourse, Israeli operations inside Iran are frequently cited as evidence that information warfare now precedes armed confrontation.
Military expert Fu Qianshao, a former analyst of the Chinese Air Force, described Mossad’s alleged success in embedding agents and internally disabling Iranian radar and air defense systems as a “new paradigm of information warfare.”
The Israeli strikes of June 2025, which reportedly encountered minimal resistance due to compromised systems, reinforced this assessment.
According to Fu, such tactics transcend traditional combat.
When the boundary between war and sabotage blurs
Rather than confronting air defenses externally, Mossad is described as having undermined them internally, neutralizing deterrence before aircraft entered contested airspace.
Another Chinese expert, Yan Wei, echoed these concerns, emphasizing that infiltration of sensitive Iranian facilities exposed structural weaknesses rather than mere technological gaps.
Legal safeguards and security protocols, he argued, are insufficient against operations exploiting bureaucratic vulnerabilities.
Professor Li Li, a specialist in West Asian affairs, highlighted Israeli cyber operations targeting research centers as proof that information warfare functions as a force multiplier.
Unlike conventional strikes, these actions blur the distinction between espionage and sabotage.
Meanwhile, Tian Wenlin, Director of the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at Renmin University, warned that sustained infiltration pressures could push Tehran to accelerate nuclear capabilities as a defensive countermeasure.
China extracts strategic lessons from Iran’s vulnerabilities
Chinese analysts argue that Mossad’s operations exposed fractures in internal control mechanisms, digital security, and inter agency coordination.
For Beijing, the episode serves as a strategic warning, information warfare exploits administrative seams as effectively as battlefield weaknesses.
If a state with extensive security apparatus can be penetrated, similar methods could target strategic infrastructure elsewhere, including commercial and energy corridors of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The prevailing conclusion within Chinese policy circles is preventative, sovereignty in the digital era depends on systemic integrity as much as on military power.
Iran’s role in the Silk Road architecture
China’s involvement in Iran is framed within long term strategic planning.
Iran occupies a pivotal geographic position linking East Asia, West Asia, and Europe.
Maritime routes through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab remain vital to China’s energy security.
Any destabilization inside Iran would directly disrupt these corridors.
Consequently, Chinese officials repeatedly reaffirm support for Iranian sovereignty while opposing what they characterize as unilateral pressure.
China intensifies counterintelligence coordination
As reports of Israeli infiltration intensified throughout 2025 and early 2026, Beijing expanded counterintelligence cooperation with Tehran.
Since January 2026, joint evaluations have reportedly focused on infiltration pathways and digital vulnerabilities.
Through the Ninth Bureau of China’s Ministry of State Security, China is described as implementing a comprehensive strategy to dismantle Israeli and American intelligence networks inside Iran.
By strengthening Iran’s digital sovereignty, Beijing is encouraging Tehran to abandon Western software in favor of encrypted Chinese systems, effectively constructing a digital “Great Wall.”
The objective is the protection of critical infrastructure underpinning the Belt and Road corridors.
Tehran is integrated into a broader security strategy
Beyond bilateral cooperation, Beijing seeks to integrate Iran into wider multilateral mechanisms through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
The SCO’s security structure is centered on the Regional Anti Terrorist Structure (RATS), based in Tashkent, which coordinates intelligence sharing.
Although originally designed to address extremist threats, this framework now provides channels for the exchange of information concerning cross border risks.
Following Iran’s full accession in 2023, this integration sends the message that information pressure on Tehran carries implications beyond bilateral relations, placing it within a broader Eurasian security network.
Beijing’s multi layered response to Mossad sabotage
Israeli intelligence operations inside Iran are widely interpreted in Chinese analyses as indicative of how modern conflict is evolving.
Information warfare, combining cyber access, human networks, administrative penetration, and precision strike capability, reshapes the strategic environment before conventional escalation becomes visible.
Beijing’s response reflects precisely this assessment.
Digital “insulation,” substitution of navigation systems, radar modernization, satellite monitoring, multilateral coordination through the SCO, and long term economic engagement form a multi layered counterstrategy.
China responds to the deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford with the formidable J-20 fighters
Nevertheless, China’s involvement is not limited to the information domain.
This is because, last week, as President Trump ordered the USS Gerald R. Ford, the most advanced aircraft carrier of the United States Navy, to move toward the Persian Gulf, where the USS Abraham Lincoln was already deployed alongside nine additional American warships, a Chinese military attaché in Tehran presented a model of the Chinese J-20 fighter jet to the commander of the Iranian Air Force.
On 8 February, the Chinese military attaché delivered the J-20 model to Brigadier General Bahman Behmard on the occasion of Iranian Air Force Day.
Although no contract has been announced, the timing and symbolism of the Chinese move were impossible to ignore, as they represented more than a ceremonial gesture, they were aimed at sending a message not only to Tehran, but also to the United States and Israel.
Dr. Farzin Nadimi of the Washington Institute noted: “If China supplies fifth generation fighters to Iran, it would not only enhance Tehran’s deterrence, but also signal Beijing’s readiness to directly challenge American sanctions.”
A strong symbolic message to the United States and Israel
The event received extensive coverage in Iranian state media, fueling speculation that Beijing may be considering the export of its most advanced stealth fighter, the J-20, to Tehran, at a time when the United States is concentrating warships in the region.
It is worth noting that China has consistently maintained that the J-20 is intended exclusively for domestic use by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force and has never been offered for export.
On the other hand, Israeli analyst Tal Inbar warned against assigning excessive significance to what may be a routine diplomatic gesture.
“Sometimes a tabletop model is simply that. Do not hold your breath waiting to see real J-20s in Iran.”
Consequently, the question remains whether China is genuinely considering exporting the J-20 to Iran, or whether the presentation of the model to the commander of the Iranian Air Force was intended solely to convey a strategic message to Washington, that Tehran is not isolated and that Beijing is willing to support it politically, technologically, and militarily.
China understands that it is engaged in a deep, systemic, and strategically driven confrontation
Within this framework, resilience precedes retaliation.
The objective is the strengthening of systems rather than necessarily escalating confrontation.
China’s involvement in Iran therefore carries dual significance.
It reinforces a strategic partner facing sustained information pressure, while simultaneously advancing Beijing’s understanding of hybrid conflict and systemic vulnerability.
The confrontation unfolding is structural.
Dominance in this environment depends on fortified infrastructure, secure networks, and institutional coordination, as much as on military platforms.
Interception, insulation, and the prioritization of tactical and strategic objectives define Beijing’s approach, a calibrated effort to contain information penetration while preserving the broader strategic balance across Eurasia and the Middle East.
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