The American military invasion of Caracas, the "snatching" of President Maduro, and Trump's declarations that the US is now governing Venezuela undoubtedly constitute a geopolitical earthquake. This is an upheaval that Chinese President Xi Jinping described as a "period of turbulence and great change," shifts that are set to overturn every concept of the current international order. An interpretation was also provided by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who noted that US actions against Venezuela are further proof that the current global order is in a state of collapse and that a new world is beginning to take shape.
Orban warned that "even more unstable, unpredictable, and dangerous years" are coming. There is no doubt that the American president's actions, combined with his new foreign policy, are blowing up every "constant" in the global balance of power and launching new developments and a new world map.
Message to China
The Trump administration is serious about its Western Hemisphere strategy, as described in the recent National Security Strategy document featuring the "Trump Corollary" across the continent, argues Ryan Berg, director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in an article for Politico. As he mentions, the fact that President Trump launched this operation just hours after Maduro met with China's special envoy sends a clear and unmistakable message to China and its role in the Americas. It also sends the message that the "axis of autocrats" is strong during peacetime but not decisive for one another in moments of maximum need regarding regime security. Trump already pointed this out in today's statements about the military operation, where he referenced other successful US attacks against adversaries, including Iran. The axis of autocrats, especially Russia and China, may feel additional pressure to prove its value to allies like Venezuela.
"One could easily imagine a Chinese indictment against a Taiwanese leader"
In the view of Justin Logan, director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, the geopolitical implications of the operation in Venezuela and the arrest of dictator Nicolás Maduro and his wife will be limited because its impact on the global balance of power will be constrained. Nevertheless, two small but potentially significant consequences can be foreseen.
First, other great powers could in the future leverage the Trump administration's claim that the attack was legal because Maduro was under indictment in the United States. One could easily imagine a Chinese prosecution against a Taiwanese leader, under dubious pretexts, as a means to facilitate a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Then the United States might argue the analogy is incorrect because the US indictment was legitimate while the Chinese one was not. Second, President Trump prides himself on his unpredictability, and this attack will only reinforce other countries' perceptions of the unstable nature of American foreign policy. Leaders in confrontation with the Trump administration will likely think more carefully about how to protect themselves, whether that means developing closer ties with China or Russia, or creating clearer plans to avoid operations like the one in Caracas. More fear will be accompanied by more careful thought on how to oppose an unpredictable America.
"Without Venezuelan oil, Cuba's political system will finally collapse"
Stephen Kinzer, New York Times correspondent and senior fellow at Brown University's Watson School, argues that Trump is the most resource-focused American president since Eisenhower. He sees Venezuelan oil as a grand prize. When he demands that countries stop buying oil from Russia and Iran, and they ask what alternative they have, he would love to be able to answer: "I will give you oil from Venezuela." This is a significant geopolitical weapon.
This, however, is a long-term dream. Secretary of State Marco Rubio's motivation is more immediate. It stems from a background focused on a 65-year-old dream: the overthrow of Fidel Castro. The fact that Castro is dead does not matter—Rubio and his support group in Florida still want to destroy him. They see the intervention in Venezuela as important not for itself, but as a way to cut Cuba's "lifeline." Rubio hopes that without Venezuelan oil, Cuba's political system will finally collapse. This will turn both countries into subservient clients—or bloody battlefields.
"Synonymous with overconfident failure"
As Emma Ashford, senior fellow at the Stimson Center, argues, America has always made an exception for Latin America. Even when the country's founders clearly stated their desire for the United States to stay away from European power politics, they recognized America's special interests—and its willingness to act on them—on its own continent. Later presidents would invoke the Monroe Doctrine to justify repeated military interventions and regime changes in the region. The arrest of Nicolás Maduro may have violated various domestic and international laws. But it was not contrary to America's historical willingness to violate all sorts of rules in its backyard.
In geopolitical terms, the most important element of this attack may be to show that the administration is serious about the so-called "Trump Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine. As described in the recently published National Security Strategy, this corollary promises to "deny non-continental competitors," such as Russia and China, access to the region. This message could not have been sent more clearly than last night, when a Chinese delegation, which had recently arrived for talks with Maduro, woke up like everyone else in Caracas to the sound of airstrikes. America is reaffirming its traditional role in the region and sending the message that the Western Hemisphere is closed to outside powers.
In reality, this may ultimately mean that American dependence on regime change is just as destructive in the Western Hemisphere as it was in the Middle East. For now, the Trump administration's plan seems to be a relatively moderate change of leadership: removing Maduro and replacing him with someone within the regime who will be more cooperative. Donald Trump explicitly rejected the concept of democratic regime change when he told reporters that María Corina Machado could not muster enough support to lead the country. But this vision for a government in Venezuela, co-managed by the US, could very easily fail, from a military coup to open chaos in the streets and a much larger American intervention. It is simply too early to tell—and history shows that our ability to predict the consequences of targeted regime change is poor. If the worst happens, what then will be the message that Beijing or Moscow receives? Will it be a message of strength and security, encouraging them not to involve themselves in Latin America? If Donald Trump's luck does not hold, then the "Trump Corollary" may ultimately end up being little more than a synonym for overconfident failure.
"Long term, Venezuela could play a much larger role in the global oil market"
From an energy perspective, short-term US pressure on Venezuela is a relatively small factor, argues Bob McNally, founder and president of Rapidan Energy Group. As he says, global oil markets have sufficient supply, with Venezuela contributing only about 4% to the crude imports of China and the US. Yes, Chinese refineries would take a big hit if cheap barrels were lost. But it does not pose a serious threat to China's oil sector, much less its economy or national security.
Long term, Venezuela could play a much larger role in the global oil market, given its vast, albeit expensive, reserves. However, it is necessary to recognize that achieving this long-term potential will be a long and difficult path, with many political, commercial, and market risks. Many wonder if Washington would ask a future pro-US government, post-Maduro, to leave OPEC. Venezuela was a founding member of OPEC. We doubt it would, because it would infuriate Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and in 2020 Trump learned to appreciate OPEC's supply management after pleading with the organization to cut production to save U.S. shale.
Rapidan told its clients weeks ago that the odds were 70% that President Trump would successfully replace or manipulate Maduro. Although Maduro was successfully removed and placed under US supervision, this transition is not yet complete. It is not clear who will succeed the current government, when it will happen, and how they will relate to the US. What remains clear is that Trump is determined to make Venezuela the first concrete example of the "Trump Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine. US pressure and diplomacy will continue until the US considers that its foreign policy, national security, anti-narcotics, and energy interests have been met.
"Threaten the leaders of unruly allies and weak adversaries"
Daniel W. Drezner, professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, argues that in the summer of 2024, he warned that a second Trump administration would increase, not decrease, American military expansionism: "Although the term is often applied to him, Trump is not an isolationist—he is a mercantilist who prefers the use of force on this continent." The use of force to overthrow Maduro is a strong enough piece of evidence to support this view. In the future, an interesting result of this US action is how other heads of state and government will react. A constant feature of Trump's foreign policy is the focus on pressure or praise of individual leaders of other countries. Some of my colleagues have characterized this as a "neo-royalist" way of thinking, focusing on elites rather than laws or institutions.
The obvious consequence of this action is that the Trump administration does not care about international laws or norms when it attacks foreign leaders. I strongly suspect that the Trump administration will use this action against Maduro to threaten the leaders of unruly allies and weak adversaries that they may be next—and such threats might work. Just as members of the US Congress expressed fears of personal attacks during the Trump era due to his violent rhetoric, countries without strong support from great powers may become more adaptable to US pressure. Of course, another result could be that leaders of other countries link themselves more closely with other great powers as political insuranceagainst the US.
"Complicating his own grand strategy"
Daniel R. DePetris, from Defense Priorities and the Chicago Tribune, states that the nighttime US airstrike and special forces operation that captured Maduro and his wife was flawlessly planned and executed. Trump is right to be proud of the results; Maduro, a man who survived the first Trump administration's maximum pressure strategy, will soon find himself in a US courtroom as a defendant. If the capture of Maduro tells us anything, it is that Trump is extremely serious about applying the so-called Trump Corollary in the Western Hemisphere.
In less than a year, Latin America was transformed from a permanent peripheral area of US grand strategy into one of its primary theaters. The Trump administration's National Security Strategy defined the Western Hemisphere not only as a key security priority for the US but also as Washington's exclusive sphere of influence, where non-continental powers are not welcome. Latin American leaders who satisfy US demands, such as Argentine President Javier Milei and Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, will be rewarded; those who do not, such as Maduro, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel, and Colombian President Gustavo Petro, will face intense economic and rhetorical pressure from the US—including the threat of a nighttime kidnapping operation. Current US policy is guided less by the spread of democracy or regional economic integration and more by the exercise of raw power.
Of course, the United States is not the first country on the planet that wants to maintain its advantage in its near abroad—and yet, maintaining hegemony through coercion is not without cost. Even small powers do not like being dictated to, and if pressure becomes too intense or demands unacceptable, they may choose to apply hedging or even balancing strategies to protect their own security interests. Regarding Latin America specifically, the most likely alternative lurking is China, which already constitutes the top trading partner for many governments in the region. It would thus be ironic if Trump's military operation in Venezuela ends up complicating his own grand strategy in the long term.
"A mad dash for Venezuela's resources"
Leland Lazarus, CEO of Lazarus Consulting, states that the removal of Maduro by the US might kill several birds with one stone: It could increase the US oil supply and reduce oil prices, limit drug trafficking, remove China, Russia, and Iran from their strategic presence, and weaken other regional rivals, such as Cuba and Nicaragua. But it might also trigger a mad dash for Venezuela's resources.
China, in particular, risks losing oil flows, more than $60 billion in lost loans, and one of its reliable political bases in the Western Hemisphere. Two specific examples prove this: The House Select Committee on the CCP recently recognized that the SKIPPER tanker, seized by the US, had ties to China. And in November last year, at a business forum in Miami, María Corina Machado said that in 2012 China's state-owned CITIC company conducted the only full geological survey of Venezuela's critical mineral resources and is the only company that holds this survey to this day.
I worry, argues Lazarus, that the official invocation of the Monroe Doctrine by the US may actually provoke a reaction across the region because the locals do not want a return to unhindered American imperialism. Furthermore, I worry that the government does not have a well-designed plan for the "day after." Trump said the US would "run" Venezuela until there is a peaceful transition. How will we ensure that Machado does not return to a Venezuela full of factions? What happens if members of Maduro's inner circle start a prolonged guerrilla war with weapons supplied by Cuba, Nicaragua, China, Russia, or Iran? These are issues that must be resolved now to avoid a repeat of the Iraq or Afghanistan scenario.
"Ukraine and Taiwan should be seriously worried"
Ryan Crocker, career diplomat and ambassador, says the immediate comparison that comes to mind is Operation Just Cause, the overthrow and capture of Manuel Antonio Noriega in Panama in December 1989. It was a more costly military operation (23 American soldiers killed in action), but with a clear result: Within a week, Panama's electoral commission declared the winner of the disputed May 1989 elections as the legitimate president. It is not so clear what will happen in Venezuela. Maduro is gone, but the regime remains—his vice president has been sworn in as president. Without troops on the ground, how can we influence events?
The international reaction to Operation Just Cause included a UN Security Council resolution of condemnation, introduced by the Soviet Union, supported by China, and vetoed by the US, UK, and France. It will be very interesting to see what happens this time. If Russia and China remain silent, it will be a huge step toward the emergence of a new world balance of power. Ukraine and Taiwan should be seriously worried.
"Latin American countries will reassess their very limited capacity to deter US military attacks"
Stephen McFarland, retired US diplomat, estimates that this is a defining moment for US relations with Latin America. The US didn't just arrest Maduro and overthrow the Venezuelan military, but also announced that the US will "run" Venezuela until there is a democratic transition, recover properties and interests seized by Venezuela from US companies, and rebuild the oil industry there to protect US access to energy. Inexplicably, President Trump has also minimized the role in the future Venezuelan government of María Corina Machado, who had unified the opposition and led it to victory in the 2024 presidential elections. The message is that the US will do whatever it wants in the continental region to maintain access to natural resources and that it possesses the military power to do so.
In response, most states in the region—which primarily oppose Maduro but worry about their sovereignty against the all-powerful US—have little room for action right now beyond criticizing the Trump administration. In fact, some states will hope for a reduction in migration from Venezuela, while others will remain silent to avoid trade sanctions from the US. Cuba and Nicaragua must fear they are next on the list for regime change, while Colombia and Mexico fear US military attacks against drug traffickers. Outside the continent, Russia may try to trade its submission in Venezuela for US acceptance regarding Ukraine.
Long term, Latin American countries will reassess their very limited capacity to deter US military attacks. A generation from now, the region may not be as dependent on the US and may have more, rather than fewer, ties with extra-regional players. A continent that fears the US, instead of seeing it as a powerful partner, bodes ill for America's strategic interests in the future. A critical factor is whether the US will manage to steer a stable and sustainable democratic transition in Venezuela. Will migration from Venezuela decrease, and will migrants return to their country? Will Venezuelans accept US rules for oil production and export? Regime change and state-building are extremely difficult, long-term, and require much more than military superiority. If the US does not achieve a democratic transition in Venezuela, if they sink as in Iraq and Afghanistan and are distracted from other issues in the hemisphere, then they will have lost their big gamble for regime change in Venezuela.
"The US just ceded the strategic advantage to rally global support for the defense of Taiwan"
According to Curt Mills, executive director of The American Conservative, perhaps the most important result of January 3rd is that the US just ceded the strategic advantage to rally global support for the defense of Taiwan. It is particularly revealing that the Trump White House lost allies even from the global hard right with this move.
What is also worrying is the apparent lack of a strategic plan by the administration. Speaking at Mar-a-Lago, President Trump seemed open to allowing Maduro's former right hand, acting President Delcy Rodríguez, to succeed Maduro. But Rodríguez appeared less than cooperative, demanding the release of her boss and confirming that only Maduro is legitimate in her eyes. Must America now re-engage? Finally, it was disappointing to hear how much the legacy of the Global War on Terror weighs on US military power. It is positive that the US perfected special operations during the wars in the Middle East, as Joint Chiefs Chairman Dan Caine said, but America lost those wars in the end, despite tactical successes. The only acceptable, but dubious, justification for the aggressive stance in Latin America is the expulsion of China from the US "backyard." But, strangely, Trump promised China: "There will be no problem. They will get oil." Oil, that is, which will apparently have been snatched from the people of Venezuela.
"Too early for anyone to celebrate a potential resource boom based on oil"
Diego Rivera Rivota, research associate at Columbia University, estimates that the US-led operation carried out in central Caracas and at several major Venezuelan security installations is more than historic. Although it indeed marks the end of the Nicolás Maduro regime, we do not know who will govern Venezuela from here on—whether it will be a US-led transitional government, Vice President Delcy Rodríguez and other actors of the Maduro regime, or someone else.
In this context, the geopolitical implications of removing the leader—albeit illegitimate and deeply unpopular—of the country with the largest crude oil reserves are quite complex and may have deeper consequences globally. In fact, the developments of these days and the next may be perceived in other capitals as a signal of transition to an international system in which powerful countries can claim spheres of influence, as happened in most countries of the 19th and early 20th centuries.
Regarding global oil markets, it is important to note that possessing the largest crude oil reserves does not automatically translate into the ability to quickly bring massive oil production to global markets. Venezuela's oil production peaked in 1997 with more than 3.5 million barrels per day, only to collapse to 0.9 million barrels per day in 2024, after years of mismanagement and corruption. Reversing a trend of nearly two decades is not impossible, but it would require massive funding, clear incentives for oil and gas companies, and time. This would only be possible with some basic conditions of governance, stability, and clear incentives for companies to invest in Venezuela, which is easier said than done. Furthermore, the world has changed since 2006. Prospects for global demand are very uncertain, with very limited growth and expected stagnation somewhere in the 2030s. Moreover, if we stick only to the Latin American region, Brazil and Argentina have significantly increased their oil production in the last five years, while Guyana has started from scratch and is close to surpassing Venezuela's current production, according to preliminary 2025 data. Overall, it would be too early for anyone to celebrate a potential resource boom based on oil for the US.
"The next ones"
Mie Hoejris Dahl, a Danish journalist, argues that the US attacks on Venezuela and the capture of Nicolás Maduro caused shock in Latin America and the world. A few hours later, global leaders began taking positions that showed growing divisions. The presidents of Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico were quick to condemn the US attacks on Venezuela. All of them have received threats and rhetorical pressure from US President Donald Trump in recent months—and they may worry that they could be the next ones, in one way or another.
The US attacks on Venezuela have sharpened global and regional divisions. One line runs between Maduro's autocratic allies—such as Cuba, Iran, and Russia—who condemn the operation as imperialist overreach, and democratic actors who were pushing for the end of Maduro's power but worry about regime change through the use of force. In Latin America, another dichotomy is emerging between leaders aligned with Trump, primarily right-wing leaders who cheer the overthrow, and non-aligned—often left-wing—presidents who condemn it for reasons of sovereignty. In the coming weeks, Latin American leaders—especially those not politically aligned with Trump—are likely to intensify calls for peace, respect for sovereignty, and adherence to international law in multilateral forums. At the same time, even the most vocal critics of the operation will have strong incentives to quietly satisfy Washington. Many Latin American governments are likely to invest more in drug control and migration management.
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