Former US President Joe Biden once vowed to make Saudi Arabia a "pariah." Now Washington may be doing the opposite, offering Riyadh an American security guarantee that could redefine the US role in the Middle East. It would constitute one of the most dramatic reversals in American foreign policy in decades.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman, the kingdom's de facto leader, arrives in Washington with the intention of purchasing advanced anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense systems, as well as F-35s, fighters that currently only Israel possesses in the Middle East.
President Trump recently reiterated his desire to see Saudi Arabia, a regional power in the Middle East, recognize Israel, joining the so-called Abraham Accords. And, according to a report by the news website Axios, Israel wants any sale of F-35s to the kingdom to have recognition as a necessary precondition.
The shift after the US "strategic understanding" with Qatar
This change follows President Donald Trump's recently announced "strategic understanding" with Qatar, a partner that hosts the large Al Udeid Air Base but has never been a treaty ally, Modern Diplomacy explains. The executive order pledged that the US would "regard any armed attack" on Qatar as "a threat to the peace and security of the United States." The statement was reminiscent of NATO's Article 5, but without Senate ratification, it remains policy, not law.
This distinction is crucial. Despite the frequent use of the term "alliances," the US has relatively few binding defense treaties—formal, ratified agreements that oblige it to intervene if an ally is attacked. Beyond NATO, these include bilateral treaties with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, as well as the ANZUS framework with Australia and New Zealand. These legally binding commitments transcend governments and form the core of American credibility.
Partner does not mean ally
In contrast, the "Major Non-NATO Ally" status offers defense cooperation and access to American military equipment but no guarantee of military intervention. It is cooperation, not commitment.
This difference has real consequences. In 1994, the Budapest Memorandum offered Ukraine "security assurances" rather than guarantees, in exchange for surrendering its nuclear arsenal. When Russia invaded in 2014, the promises proved unenforceable. This lesson is not lost on Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as he prepares for his visit to Washington on November 17–19. He will seek something that will endure over time—a guarantee that will not vanish with a change of administration.
What a credible US–Saudi Arabia agreement needs
To be believable, such a pact must rest on a more solid foundation than an executive order. The Carter Doctrine in 1980 warned that "any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States." It essentially extended the American security umbrella over the Gulf.
However, Riyadh remembers 2019, when Iranian drones struck Saudi Arabia's oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais, temporarily halving global production. Washington condemned the attack but did not respond militarily. For the Saudis, this restraint exposed the gap between declared policy and actual deterrence.
The shifting strategic balance
The strategic balance is shifting. Iran has withstood American and Israeli strikes and significant losses of its proxies, but the regime persists. Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and their allies are weakened but not neutralized.
As Washington's attention shifts toward Asia and the Western Hemisphere, Tehran may regroup with help from China or Russia, which seek to counterbalance American power. Iran's ambition to dominate the region has been delayed—not eliminated.
This framework will be used by bin Salman to evaluate any American proposal. A credible security partnership must deter Iran, reassure investors, and align with Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030. But under the US Constitution, a defense treaty requires a two-thirds majority in the Senate—an uncertain prospect in today's polarized political climate. The framers designed it that way: having seen how Europe's intricate alliances drew countries into wars, they made the ratification of treaties difficult, so that only the most permanent commitments would bind the country.
Almost eighty years ago, President Franklin D. Roosevelt met King Abdulaziz on the USS Quincy in the Great Bitter Lake, Egypt. That meeting created the unspoken understanding that defined US–Saudi Arabia relations for decades: American protection in exchange for Saudi stability and oil. The Carter Doctrine later codified this principle. What bin Salman is now seeking is its modernization—a clear affirmation that the US remains the ultimate guarantor of Gulf security.
Washington's dilemma
For the US, the calculation is complicated. Such a commitment could secure a historic normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel—the next major step after the Abraham Accords—and reassert American leadership in a region where China is increasing its influence. But it would also tie the US more closely to an unstable region, at a time when American voters are wary of new international entanglements.
Strategic vision or another paper promise?
The prospect of a new US–Saudi Arabia security agreement is both strategic and symbolic. Done correctly, it can lay the foundation for an era of pragmatic cooperation, advance steps toward peace in Gaza, and solidify a stable balance of power. Done incorrectly, it can create another illusion of protection—one that will collapse when tested, as happened in Ukraine.
From "pariah" to partner is an impressive journey for Riyadh. Whether this partnership will endure will depend on whether Washington is ready to make a real commitment or just another proclamation destined to be lost in the Gulf sea.
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