The deployment marks the beginning of a massive military operation by the Trump administration, characterized as a dual campaign of "war on drugs" and "war on terror" in a manner that, ironically, also recalls the George Bush campaign.
CNN Brasil reports that Caracas has mobilized thousands of missiles supplied by Russia in response.
Washington's message was vague enough to allow multiple interpretations, but broad enough to justify a sweeping regional buildup. The operation is unprecedented in scale, which raises the stakes for Venezuela and its allies, with the US presenting the operation as an "anti-cartel" surge across the continent.
Adding another layer of complexity, US President Donald Trump has reportedly simultaneously mentioned the possibility of talks with his Venezuelan counterpart Maduro, in a move that shows, once again, Trump's erratic diplomatic zig-zags. So much for strategic coherence.
The forgotten doctrine returns
In any case, the current American presidency is ushering in a new stage in Washington's continental security doctrine—a stage that combines anti-terrorism rhetoric with narcopolitics, producing an elastic justification for power projection anywhere from the Andes to the Antilles.
The rhetoric of the "war on drugs" can hardly be taken seriously: it is noteworthy, first of all, that most of the drug supply fueling drug problems in the United States comes from Mexico and Colombia. According to estimates by the US agencies themselves, approximately 90% of the cocaine consumed in the US originates in Colombia and is trafficked into the country via Mexico.
In August, media reported that the US naval buildup was about "intimidation, not invasion—at least for now, but history teaches us that intimidation often precedes escalation." At the time, such an assessment seemed quite cautious. But conditions are evolving, and the massive scale of the current deployments raises the question: are we approaching the threshold where intimidation turns into direct military action?
Is an invasion coming?
Officially, Trump's advisers deny any intention to invade Venezuela. However, "denials" have historically served as preludes to escalation. On the other hand, as Asia Times puts it, the warmongering signals towards Venezuela are proving to be a "gift to China," reinforcing Beijing's argument that Washington uses military coercion instead of diplomacy. Global perceptions matter, after all.
In any case, Caracas believes it is under existential threat—and is acting accordingly. CNN's office for Latin America reported that Venezuela requested security assistance from both Russia and China, while CNN Brasil reported the same, with additional details regarding requests for military coordination.
So far, Moscow and Beijing have responded with rhetorical severity but also with measured restraint. However, warning signs abound. Alexey Zhuravlyov (deputy head of the Russian parliament's defense committee) reportedly stated that Moscow could provide Venezuela with Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missiles. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, in turn, recently stated that the Kremlin is "ready to act fully within the framework of the mutually agreed obligations in this agreement with our Venezuelan friends."
Beijing, for its part, has escalated its support by unveiling a new "zero-tariff" trade agreement with Caracas during the Shanghai Expo 2025, an agreement announced by Venezuela's Vice Minister of Foreign Trade. For Beijing, it provides a commercial and strategic entry point into the Western Hemisphere at a time when Washington is tightening its sanctions amid tensions.
Such an alignment should not be underestimated. The crisis provides a strategic opening for China to enhance its presence in Latin America, while presenting itself as a stabilizing force. Unlike Washington, Beijing does not carry the burden of decades of military interventions in the region. Understatements on economic ties, infrastructure investments, and energy partnerships give China significant leverage—enough to reshape regional diplomacy without firing a single bullet. It is no wonder that Chinese analysts present the Trump operation as a self-inflicted geopolitical loss for Washington.
If one examines the Trump pattern—improvisational enough to shock but cautious enough to avoid prolonged troop commitments (hence "TACO")—a full-scale invasion remains unlikely. However, targeted attacks or special operations raids cannot be ruled out. Limited action could be presented domestically as "decisive," without engaging the US in occupation duties. Yet, even limited attacks would involve huge risks of escalation.
In July 2025, I argued that Trump's policy on Venezuela was driven by "surrealistic" thinking and corporate cost-benefit calculations, especially regarding the return of Chevron to Caracas. If the attacks destabilize Venezuela's oil fields, global supply could be restricted overnight, driving prices upward. This would erode the foundation of Trump's domestic economic message, not to mention creating headaches for American energy companies operating—or trying to operate—in the region. The problem is that Washington does not always act according to purely rational economic logic, so extreme scenarios should not be dismissed so quickly.
The confrontation, in any case, constitutes a sovereignty crisis for Caracas, but also an opportunity for Russia and China within the framework of the New Cold War. Moreover, it is a test of unity for Latin America—and a high-risk gamble for the US.
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