The unanimous decision by eastern Libya's House of Representatives on October 20 to approve the maritime delimitation agreement with Turkey is not an ordinary parliamentary decision. It constitutes a major political and strategic reversal by the very same legislative authority that had rejected the agreement in 2020 and severed political relations with Ankara due to the military support it provided to the Tripoli government during its conflict with the forces of Khalifa Haftar. Six years later, the former adversaries find common ground around an agreement that may reshape regional alliances and strengthen Ankara's position against its rivals in the Eastern Mediterranean. Haftar's shift fits into a broader geopolitical competition for the Eastern Mediterranean, where Turkey's maritime claims clash with the ambitions of Egypt, Greece, and Israel. Also at the center of the confrontation are control over subsea energy resources and the transit routes of Mediterranean natural gas to European markets.
Saddam Haftar's Turkish overture
Turkey and Libya's then-Government of National Accord (GNA), led by Fayez al-Sarraj, signed the maritime delimitation agreement on November 27, 2019, while Haftar's military offensive against Tripoli was underway. Ankara's subsequent military intervention, involving the deployment of military advisors and unmanned aerial vehicles, proved decisive in reversing the offensive and altering the balance of power on the ground. However, Ankara's relations with eastern Libya gradually began to change. By 2025, Turkey had already opened channels of communication with Haftar's camp, seeking to expand its influence beyond the authorities in western Libya, whom it had supported for years. In April 2025, Saddam Haftar, one of Khalifa Haftar's sons and a rising figure in eastern Libya's military establishment, visited Turkey.
In August, this was followed by a visit from the head of Turkish intelligence, Ibrahim Kalin, to Benghazi, where he met with Haftar and his sons. Military and intelligence contacts between the two sides have intensified since then. BBC Monitoring highlighted, in November 2025, Saddam's role in the rapprochement between the two sides. The following month, the Polish Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) pointed out that securing parliamentary approval of the maritime delimitation agreement from eastern Libya constituted one of the primary objectives of Turkish policy. Haftar's influence in eastern Libya lends particular political significance to his rapprochement with Ankara, as it facilitates the shift in the eastern parliament's stance toward the agreement. At the same time, the rapprochement serves the political ambitions of the Haftar family. Closer ties with Turkey offer access to Turkish military technology, reconstruction contracts, and investments, while strengthening Saddam's position within Libya's fragmented political and military landscape. Simultaneously, they offer the family an alternative to its long-standing dependence on Cairo. The improvement of Turkish-Egyptian relations since 2023 has facilitated this geopolitical realignment. Haftar's pivot toward Ankara does not necessarily entail a rupture with Egypt. It shows, however, that he is no longer willing to align uncritically with Cairo's regional priorities. For Turkey, on the other hand, parliamentary approval removes a major political obstacle to its maritime ambitions and provides broader Libyan political cover for the agreement with the Tripoli government, despite the country's ongoing institutional division.
Turkey's "Blue Homeland" doctrine expands
The 2019 agreement establishes a maritime boundary line between the Turkish and Libyan coasts, south of Crete, defining the respective claims of the two countries regarding the continental shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Ankara treats the agreement as a core pillar of the "Blue Homeland" (Mavi Vatan) doctrine, which places control of the seas surrounding Turkey at the heart of its national security and economic strategy. The doctrine aims to defend Turkish maritime claims, secure access to offshore oil and natural gas deposits, and challenge arrangements that, according to Ankara, are intended to exclude it from the Eastern Mediterranean. The agreement with Libya constitutes a practical application of this strategy. It strengthens Turkey's position in maritime delimitation disputes while simultaneously supporting its ambition to evolve into a regional hub for the transit, storage, and export of energy to Europe.
Ankara seeks similar arrangements with Syria as well
On December 31, 2025, Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar announced that Turkey expects to reach a maritime delimitation agreement with Damascus within 2026, a development that could pave the way for Turkish companies to explore offshore oil and natural gas deposits. Bayraktar acknowledged that a general framework of cooperation has been discussed, though he clarified that a specific agreement is required. Therefore, this represents a negotiating objective rather than a completed maritime settlement. Taken together, Ankara's initiatives in Libya and Syria reveal a coordinated effort to strengthen its geopolitical position along the coasts of the Eastern Mediterranean, aiming to prevent rival states from imposing maritime delimitations without its participation.
The Greek islands that restrict Turkish claims
The confrontation between Turkey and Greece has deep historical roots. The Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 defined the borders of the modern Turkish Republic, while under the Treaty of Paris of 1947 the Dodecanese, including Rhodes, Kos, and Kastellorizo, were ceded by Italy to Greece. The Greek islands stretch along a large part of the western and southern Turkish coasts, from Lesbos, Chios, and Samos to Rhodes, Karpathos, and Crete. Of particular importance is Kastellorizo, which lies just 2.3 kilometers off the Turkish coast and sits at the center of the dispute over maritime jurisdiction. Athens maintains that islands possess, under international law, maritime rights, including continental shelf and EEZ rights. Ankara, conversely, argues that granting full maritime effect to the Greek islands when drawing maritime boundaries would drastically curtail the maritime projection of the Turkish mainland coast. Under the Law of the Sea, a state's EEZ may extend up to 200 nautical miles, or approximately 370 kilometers, from its baselines. When, however, overlapping claims exist, delimitation is required, during which international judicial bodies may take into account geographical specificities and principles of equity. At the core of the Greek-Turkish dispute lies the question of the maritime effect of islands when their maritime claims overlap with those of opposite mainland coasts. Greece argues that the Turkish-Libyan memorandum ignores the maritime rights of Crete and other Greek islands. Turkey, for its part, insists that these islands cannot cut off the maritime projection of its southern coasts. Athens also disputes whether Turkey and Libya possess opposite coasts capable of establishing that specific boundary line. To date, there is no definitive international court ruling that has annulled the 2019 memorandum. Its registration with the UN, however, does not constitute recognition of its legality, nor does it resolve the conflicting claims of third states.
The Israel-Greece-Cyprus axis in the Eastern Mediterranean
Israel views the Eastern Mediterranean as a strategic arena for expanding its geopolitical influence, strengthening security partnerships, and securing its energy exports to European markets. Its intensifying convergence with Greece and Cyprus, backed by Western political and business interests, forms an important component of this strategy. Israeli and Turkish interests intersect in the development of offshore natural gas deposits and access to European markets. However, they diverge increasingly over the maritime borders, energy routes, and political arrangements that will shape the future of the region. Israel seeks to strengthen its cooperation with Greece and Cyprus, reducing its dependence on Turkey and Ankara's influence over regional energy infrastructure. A 2026 analysis by the TRT World Research Centre describes the emerging Israel-Greece-Cyprus partnership as a security axis aimed at containing Turkish influence. Initial energy cooperation has now expanded into military and operational coordination, intelligence sharing, and joint security arrangements. The Cradle has also documented how trilateral cooperation, supported by Washington through the 3+1 format, has deepened collaboration in the sectors of energy, security, and infrastructure, while simultaneously opposing Turkish maritime claims. Turkey, for its part, rejects arrangements that exclude it from negotiations on maritime zones or undermine what it considers its legitimate rights. Ankara increasingly views this partnership as an attempt to strategically encircle it and curb its influence across the entire Eastern Mediterranean. Israel's security calculations are driven by its pursuit of preventing the emergence of regional powers capable of challenging its military superiority. Turkish ambitions, on the other hand, include bolstering Ankara's influence in Syria's political and security future, as well as safeguarding its strategic interests along the Syrian coast.
Cairo does not abandon its maritime claims
Egypt's opposition to the Turkish-Libyan memorandum is rooted in geography and the defense of its sovereign rights, rather than merely solidarity with Greece. The boundary line claimed by Ankara and Tripoli passes south of Crete, in an area where the maritime claims of Turkey, Libya, Greece, and Egypt intersect. Cairo assesses that the agreement infringes upon its continental shelf and EEZ rights, particularly at the western limits of its maritime jurisdiction in the Mediterranean. On August 6, 2020, Egypt and Greece signed a partial delimitation agreement for their maritime zones, defining their respective EEZs in an area overlapping with the claims of Turkey and Libya. Cairo has repeatedly rejected the Turkish-Libyan memorandum, maintaining that two states cannot conclude agreements that curtail the sovereign rights of a third state. Following the October vote in the eastern Libyan parliament, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated that the memorandum is null and void and that its approval produces no legal effect for Egypt. In an interview on November 4 with Ahram Online, Egyptian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Nader Zaki stated that Cairo has prepared a legal dossier documenting its objections and will take the necessary measures to defend its maritime borders. Ankara has proposed a separate maritime delimitation agreement to Egypt, arguing that Cairo could secure roughly 15,000 additional square kilometers of maritime jurisdiction compared to a delimitation based on Greek claims.
Egypt has not accepted Turkey's proposal, yet wants it inside the agreement
Zaki raised the question of where this additional maritime area would come from and whether it would involve waters claimed by Libya, Greece, Cyprus, or other states. Cairo insists that the relevant maps must be examined by experts in international law and that any settlement must include all involved states, including Turkey. Ankara is attempting to overcome Egyptian objections through bilateral negotiations, while Cairo seeks guarantees that any compromise will not undermine its existing maritime agreements and partnerships. Despite the disagreements, contacts among Egypt, Turkey, and Libya continue. Zaki acknowledged that recent diplomatic signals are encouraging, though he stressed that no immediate solution is in sight. The improvement in relations between Cairo and Ankara has not altered Egypt's rejection of the Turkish-Libyan memorandum.
The natural gas deposits behind the geopolitical maps
A September 2025 study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimates that roughly 80 trillion cubic feet of natural gas remain in the Eastern Mediterranean. A separate estimate by the US Geological Survey (USGS) puts the mean undiscovered, technically recoverable conventional natural gas resources of the region at 286.2 trillion cubic feet. These represent different categories of energy resources, which should not be confused with commercially proven reserves. Among the most significant discoveries are Israel's Leviathan and Tamar fields, Egypt's Zohr field, and Cyprus's Aphrodite field. Syria, according to earlier data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), holds estimated reserves of 8.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. However, the multi-year war has destroyed much of its energy infrastructure and drastically curtailed production. Lebanon, on the other hand, has yet to confirm commercially exploitable offshore natural gas reserves, despite indications of the energy potential of its maritime areas.
The competing energy strategies
Three competing regional strategies have taken shape around these resources. Turkey seeks to prevent its maritime exclusion and strengthen its role as an energy corridor linking regional producers to Europe. Israel, Greece, and Cyprus promote cooperation to develop offshore deposits and establish export interconnections to European markets. Egypt aims to maintain its position as a regional hub for processing and exporting natural gas, utilizing its LNG liquefaction facilities at Idku and Damietta. These strategies intersect with the commercial interests of major energy groups, such as American firms Chevron and ExxonMobil, Italy's Eni, France's TotalEnergies, Greece's Energean, and QatarEnergy. The expansion of American energy companies into offshore exploration in Greece and Cyprus adds yet another dimension to Ankara's concerns regarding the formation of a regional energy network from which Turkey may be left out. The East Mediterranean Gas Forum, whose members include Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Italy, France, Jordan, and Palestine, reflects these converging and competing ambitions. Turkey remains outside the organization due to its disputes with Cyprus and Greece over maritime zones, as well as the broader confrontation surrounding the 2019 Turkish-Libyan memorandum. Beyond regional balances, the US seeks to safeguard Israel's security, diversify Europe's energy sources, and prevent an escalation of disputes between the two NATO member states, Turkey and Greece. The European Union supports Greece and Cyprus, while Russia seeks to preserve its influence in regional energy markets. China, for its part, is interested in Mediterranean ports, infrastructure, and trade interconnections. Control over maritime boundaries, subsea energy resources, and export infrastructure will determine which regional powers secure access to European energy markets and which find themselves sidelined.
Libya's sovereignty at the center of rivalries
The approval of the Turkish-Libyan memorandum by eastern Libya's parliament diplomatically strengthens Turkey and signals Haftar's willingness to build broader alliances. At the same time, it places Libya at the center of a wider competition over maritime borders, energy, and geopolitical influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Libya's strategic geographical location and potential subsea energy wealth have attracted conflicting foreign interests. This fact heightens concerns that agreements concerning the country's maritime zones and natural resources may be shaped according to external geopolitical designs while internal political division remains unresolved. The absence of unified national institutions and effective oversight of agreements concerning maritime zones and the economic exploitation of natural resources leaves Libya vulnerable to such pressures. Rival governments and competing centers of power have already weakened the country's ability to negotiate from a position of strength. Haftar's rapprochement with Ankara may bolster his political standing. However, Libya's long-term interests depend on its ability to exercise sovereign control over its maritime zones and natural resources. Without a unified national position, the country's geographical location will continue to be leveraged to serve the ambitions of foreign powers, while the price of internal division will continue to be paid by the Libyan people.
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