A bombshell was dropped by Ukrainian media, revealing that over 340,000 pieces of military hardware, including 40 BMP-1 vehicles, approximately 190 artillery guns, hundreds of thousands of artillery shells and rocket systems, as well as Crotale missiles, have been transferred to Ukraine by the government of Kyriakos Mitsotakis since the eruption of the war in February 2022, according to an analysis published by the Ukrainian defense portal Militarnyi on September 10.
The valuation of total Greek military assistance, which encompasses transfers executed via intermediary states, ranges, according to the same analysis, between 350 and 450 million euros.
It appears that the obsessive alignment of the Mitsotakis government with the NATO doctrine of the «right side of history» not only damages historic ties with Moscow, but has also proven extraordinarily costly for the wallets of Greek taxpayers.
The question remains: who will answer, and in what manner, for this continuous diplomatic and geostrategic transgression that initiated in 2022 and endures to this day...
4 years of subordination to NATO strategy, 4 years backing the Zelensky regime
Greek military assistance toward Ukraine, over the span of four years, evolved from the urgent dispatch of small arms and ammunition drawn from active arsenals of the Hellenic Armed Forces into the provision of armored fighting vehicles, artillery platforms, air defense systems, training modules for Ukrainian military personnel, and the emergence of bilateral defense-industrial cooperation.
From the opening days of the conflict, Athens dispatched weaponry to Ukraine, while in autumn 2022 deliveries of BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles commenced under a circular exchange agreement (Ringtausch) with Germany for their replacement with German Marder infantry fighting vehicles.
In subsequent years, artillery pieces and munitions played a pivotal role in military support, part of which was channeled through multilateral frameworks involving the United States, Germany, and the Czech Republic.
According to the Ukraine Support Tracker of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, between January 24, 2022 and June 30, 2026, Greece committed 169 million euros directly in bilateral aid to Ukraine, a figure corresponding to 0.093% of Greek GDP.
The initiation of military aid
The decision to supply armaments to Ukraine was adopted by the administration of Kyriakos Mitsotakis during the opening days of the conflict in February 2022.
On February 27, 2022, Greece announced the shipment of military materiel aboard two C-130 transport aircraft.
This move represented an unconventional departure for Athens.
Prior to 2022, Greece abstained from providing weapons to active belligerents in armed hostilities.
Consequently, the resolution to furnish direct military support to Ukraine marked a notable pivot from established national policy.
The inaugural shipment comprised largely Soviet-legacy weapons systems held in Greek depots that could be absorbed by the Ukrainian military without extensive operational retraining.
According to tracking by Oryx, since February 2022 Greece transferred to Ukraine 20,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles, 815 RPG-18 disposable anti-tank rocket launchers, and an unquantified inventory of 122mm artillery rockets.
Russian Kalashnikovs... from Greece to Ukraine
Concurrently, small arms ammunition consignments were completed.
A portion of this weaponry bore a distinctive background: the Kalashnikov rifles originated from contraband shipments previously confiscated by Greek maritime and border authorities.
The composition of the initial aid reflected a pragmatic formula: transferring materiel that was immediately available and matched the logistical standards of the Ukrainian armed forces.
The transfer of armored platforms proved more intricate.
Greece maintained a significant inventory of BMP-1A1 Ost infantry fighting vehicles, former East German military stocks absorbed by the Bundeswehr following German reunification and subsequently transferred to Greece in the 1990s.
In total, Athens had acquired roughly 500 such BMPs, though elements were later transferred to Iraq and Egypt.
For Ukraine, these vehicles presented high utility due to familiar design parameters and rapid operational integration.
Athens, however, declined to release the BMPs without securing prior backfill replacements.
The deadlock was resolved via the German Ringtausch swap initiative, whereby nations delivered Soviet-standard materiel to Ukraine in return for modern Western armor from Germany.
The BMP-1 transfer and the «triangular» deal with Germany
In late May 2022, then-German Chancellor Olaf Scholz unveiled an accord whereby Greece would transfer BMP-1 vehicles to Ukraine, while Germany would supply Marder infantry fighting vehicles as replacements.
Initially, the precise scope of the transfer remained ambiguous.
In June, Kyriakos Mitsotakis cited a figure of 20 to 30 BMP-1s, although Greek defense sources had previously floated significantly higher numbers.
The definitive parameters were finalized in September.
Greece would deliver 40 BMP-1A1 units to Ukraine, receiving in exchange 40 Marder 1A3 vehicles from Germany.
The operational blueprint stipulated synchronized deliveries: the Greek side would release its inventory as German counterparts arrived on Greek soil.
Sealing the Ukrainian alignment and visits to Kyiv
The first Marder units touched down in Greece on October 17, 2022, and on October 19 Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba announced that shipments of Greek BMP-1s had commenced.
According to Oryx, all 40 vehicles are cataloged within verified Greek deliveries to Ukraine.
The Greek BMP-1s incorporated modifications compared to original Soviet baselines.
Following acquisition from East German depots, they had been modernized to Western standards and designated BMP-1A1 Ost.
Across select vehicles in Greek service, primary armaments were supplemented or replaced with heavy .50 caliber M2 Browning machine guns, while other BMP-1s were modified to mount twin 23mm ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft cannons.
The armor transfers unfolded alongside intensified political engagements between Athens and Kyiv.
In October 2022, the President of the Hellenic Republic, Katerina Sakellaropoulou, accompanied by Minister of National Defense Nikos Panagiotopoulos, visited Ukraine.
By that juncture, the BMP-1 transfer had transitioned from diplomatic deliberations to operational realization, anchoring military assistance as a structural pillar of bilateral ties between Greece and Ukraine.
Artillery and ammunition
Following the 2022 initial transfers, ammunition became a primary axis of Greek military support to Ukraine.
Greek arsenals held substantial stockpiles of artillery shells across varied calibers, particularly for weapon systems that, according to Ukrainian accounts, were losing operational centrality within the Hellenic Armed Forces, yet remained indispensable for the Ukrainian battlefield.
Unlike the BMP-1 swap, a significant portion of these deliveries was executed indirectly via intermediary partners, chiefly the United States and the Czech Republic.
In November 2023, it emerged that discussions were underway between Athens and Washington regarding the sale of 75,000 artillery shells from Greek stockpiles to the US, with Ukraine as the final end-user.
The arrangement encompassed 50,000 rounds of 105mm, 20,000 rounds of 155mm, and 5,000 rounds of 203mm artillery shells, valued at approximately $47 million.
The 203mm heavy shells were of notable operational importance, a caliber largely phased out across most NATO members, but critically needed for Ukrainian 2S7 Pion self-propelled guns and Western-supplied M110 howitzers.
In 2024, the Czech Republic emerged as the central conduit for channeling Greek ammunition to Ukraine under the Czech ammunition initiative.
In March, the newspaper Kathimerini reported that a deal was being structured under which Prague would procure Greek defense materiel for onward transfer to Ukraine.
The inventory submitted by Athens was extensive: 2,000 5-inch Zuni aircraft rockets, 180 2.75-inch rockets, 90,000 90mm rounds, and 4 million rounds of small arms ammunition.
The valuation of this materiel package sold to the Czech Republic was estimated at approximately 150 million euros.
Heavy tube artillery was integrated within the same framework.
Greece made available 70 towed 155mm M114A1 howitzers, categorized as non-essential for the operational requirements of the Greek military.
Transfer of M114 and M110 howitzers via the Czech channel
The M114 is an American artillery system dating to World War II, yet its standard 155mm caliber made it immediately usable by Ukraine, which faced acute artillery deficits.
According to Greek defense reporting, this constituted the second tranche of howitzers designated for sale to the Czech Republic and subsequent delivery to the Ukrainian military.
An even larger arrangement centered on 203mm heavy artillery.
In September 2025, Greek press reports indicated that the sale of 60 M110A2 self-propelled howitzers to the Czech Republic was being prepared.
Accompanying the guns was a massive ordnance cache: 50,000 M106 high-explosive shells, 40,000 M650 HERA rocket-assisted projectiles, 30,000 M404 ICM cluster munitions, and 30,000 M509A1 DPICM rounds.
In aggregate, the inventory totaled 150,000 rounds of 203mm ammunition.
The baseline valuation of the M110A2 howitzers alone was estimated at €31.2 million, while the comprehensive arms and munitions package was valued at approximately €199.4 million.
This hardware stemmed primarily from inventories designated as surplus to operational doctrine. For Athens, the transaction freed depot capacity and provided revenue earmarked for defense modernization programs.
For Ukraine, 203mm ammunition represented irreplaceable battlefield stock: industrial production across NATO had ceased, yet Ukrainian artillery brigades continued to operate systems reliant on this heavy caliber.
Initial press reports did not provide definitive proof that the equipment had departed Greece.
Clarity was provided by official submissions made by Athens to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) for 2025.
Greek howitzers on the UN registry
Greece officially declared the export to the Czech Republic of 66 M110A2 203mm self-propelled howitzers, 68 M114 155mm towed howitzers, and 56 M101 105mm towed howitzers.
Thus, the verified scope of artillery transfers exceeded earlier proposals that focused strictly on the M110A2 and M114 platforms.
However, UNROCA documentation lists the Czech Republic as the recipient state rather than Ukraine.
While bilateral agreements make it plausible that this materiel was slated for Ukraine, independent operational verification is required before confirming that all 66 M110A2s, 68 M114s, and 56 M101s are in active service with Ukrainian forces.
The reliance on the Czech conduit and third-party mechanisms explains why public estimates of total Greek military contributions to Ukraine display broad variations.
Air defense systems
Air defense proved the most complex chapter in defense cooperation between Athens and Kyiv.
Ukraine repeatedly appealed to Greece due to its diversified anti-aircraft inventory, encompassing Soviet and Russian systems alongside American Patriot batteries.
However, Greek force posture was directly tied to sovereign territorial air defense obligations.
Negotiations regarding distinct systems followed divergent paths.
The Greek S-300PMU-1 long-range system generated the highest international attention.
Originally purchased by Cyprus, the systems were redeployed to Crete following the missile crisis of the late 1990s and later transferred to Greek ownership.
Following the 2022 invasion, transferring them to Ukraine was repeatedly debated.
In September 2022, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis stated publicly that Athens did not intend to dispatch the S-300 to Ukraine, underscoring that assistance would not come at the expense of national defense readiness.
Over time, this stance adapted slightly, but the core prerequisite remained rigid: the S-300 could only depart if a modern Western equivalent was deployed in its place.
Between S-300 and Patriot
Greek media floated additional Patriot batteries as a candidate replacement.
However, practical execution stalled, and the S-300PMU-1 remained within the order of battle of the Hellenic Air Force.
A different operational policy applied to systems nearing obsolescence.
In late December 2024, the transfer of 24 RIM-7 Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missiles from Hellenic Navy and Air Force stocks to Ukraine was approved.
These missiles were approximately forty years old and no longer matched national requirements. They held immediate battlefield value for Ukraine, whose forces adapted Soviet-era Buk missile systems to fire Western Sea Sparrow interceptors under the FrankenSAM program.
Supplying Kyiv with Crotale missiles
Greek assistance also encompassed interceptor missiles for French-manufactured Crotale short-range air defense systems.
In April 2026, Kathimerini reported that Greece had transferred Crotale missiles and related air defense ordnance to Ukraine.
The precise quantity of these missiles has not been officially declassified.
In 2026, negotiations shifted toward the potential supply of Patriot interceptors.
According to Kathimerini, Ukraine requested up to 200 PAC-2 missiles from Greece, items that had served within the Hellenic Air Force for roughly 23 years.
Pressure regarding Patriot systems
Allied capitals had previously evaluated transferring one of Greece's six operational Patriot batteries to Ukraine, an option rejected by Athens.
The 2026 proposal bypassed launcher transfers, focusing strictly on missile stocks via an intermediary: Greece could sell PAC-2 missiles to Norway for subsequent donation to Ukraine.
By September 2026, Athens had not authorized either the transfer of Patriot batteries or the export of the requested interceptors, citing the necessity of preserving national air defense posture.
Concurrently, Greece was negotiating the repatriation of the Patriot battery deployed to Saudi Arabia since 2021.
However, its recall did not imply the transfer of the system to Ukraine.
F-16 pilot training and industrial cooperation
Between 2022 and 2026, Greece emerged as a consistent donor of military hardware to Ukraine.
Support transitioned from urgent dispatches of small arms, anti-tank munitions, and rockets to the transfer of 40 BMP-1 combat vehicles, extensive artillery systems, hundreds of thousands of heavy artillery rounds, and air defense missiles.
A signature characteristic of the Greek approach was the reliance on multilateral frameworks: the Ringtausch armor swap with Germany, ammunition deals involving the United States, and artillery exports routed through the Czech Republic.
Concurrently, Athens delineated between surplus materiel and core platforms required for national deterrence.
This doctrine drove the refusal to relinquish S-300 and Patriot systems, alongside a guarded posture regarding potential transfers of Mirage 2000-5 fighter aircraft.
A distinct pillar of collaboration centered on training Ukrainian personnel, notably pilots and ground crews for F-16 fighter jets.
Over the 2025–2026 period, the nature of bilateral relations shifted.
Negotiations regarding the co-production of uncrewed surface vessels (naval drones) signaled a transition from drawing down depot inventories toward integrated defense-industrial initiatives, leveraging Ukrainian operational combat experience in joint development programs.
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