However, the incident highlights an important element: the unusually close security and intelligence relationship that existed between Iran and Israel during that period. As Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement last week, a mutual security pact stipulating that an armed attack against any of the three countries will be considered an attack against all three, two regional countries that are concerned are Israel and Iran, as both have reason to believe that the alliance is directed against them. It may sound crazy today, but many readers of EurAsian Times wonder whether Israel and Iran, despite their existential hostility, could forge a similar mutual defense agreement aimed at countering and deterring the Saudi Arabia–Pakistan–Turkey "Mecca Pact." In other words, can hard national interests prevail over ideology?
The Saudi Arabia–Pakistan–Turkey alliance
On August 7, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement. This agreement follows the Riyadh-Islamabad Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement of September 2025, which also includes a mutual defense clause. The alliance combines the complementary advantages of each member: Pakistan's nuclear arsenal—as the only Muslim country possessing nuclear warheads—and its large army; Saudi Arabia's petrodollars, energy security, and religious legitimacy; and Turkey's NATO experience and defense industry. The agreement was signed at a time when Gulf countries face continuous attacks from Iran and US security guarantees to the oil-rich Gulf monarchies have proven insufficient.
While the alliance underscores the weakening US presence in the region, the two countries closely monitoring every move are Israel and Iran. Both Tehran and Jerusalem have reasons to believe that the alliance aims to curb their growing regional influence. Iran could legitimately consider that the Sunni alliance aims to contain rising Shia influence in the region. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been historical rivals, competing for influence in Western Asia. Tehran would also be cautious about the possibility of the agreement reigniting neo-Ottoman visions in Ankara. Furthermore, Iran borders Pakistan to the east, Turkey to the north, and Saudi Arabia to the west. Tehran could legitimately view this as an encirclement attempt. Given that the Saudis are already fighting against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen, Tehran fears that both Pakistan and Turkey could now provide weapons and resources to forces opposing the Houthis.
Correspondingly, Israel views Turkey as its main regional competitor. Jerusalem has accused Ankara of supporting Hamas, while the two countries' interests increasingly collide in Syria. Can the mutual insecurities caused by the Saudi Arabia–Pakistan–Turkey alliance bring Iran and Israel closer?
When Israel and Iran were friends
Iran was the second Muslim-majority country to recognize Israel. Iran voted against the UN Partition Plan for Palestinein 1947 and against Israel's admission to the UN in 1949. However, in 1950, the Iranian government granted de facto recognition to Israel. The two countries also maintained a small diplomatic presence in each other's capitals. The Shah publicly reaffirmed de facto recognition of Israel in 1960. Israel maintained a permanent delegation in Tehran, which functioned as a de facto embassy. In the late 1970s, ambassadors were exchanged and direct flights operated between Tehran and Tel Aviv.
During this period, Israel cultivated its relations with Iran as a non-Arab Muslim country to limit Arab opposition to its existence. Israel pursued David Ben-Gurion's "Alliance of the Periphery" strategy, seeking partnerships with non-Arab regional states such as Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia to counter its isolation from Arab states. Iran became a vital oil supplier for Israel, especially after the Six-Day War in 1967 when Arab producers imposed an embargo. The two countries jointly developed the Eilat–Ashkelon (Trans-Israel) pipeline to transport Iranian oil from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean for use by Israel and further shipment to Europe, bypassing the Suez Canal and Arab restrictions.
Military and intelligence ties were extensive, though kept secret. A significant late-period initiative was Project Flower (1977–1979), one of several oil-for-arms agreements signed in 1977. Under this program, the two countries decided to jointly develop long-range missiles. Israel's Mossad and the US CIA played a major role in founding Iran's SAVAK, the Shah's intelligence and security service established in 1957. Iranian officers also received specialized training in Israel. During this era, both countries' intelligence services shared the same threat perception: Pan-Arab nationalism, Ba'athist ideology in Syria and Iraq, and growing Soviet influence in the region. Within this framework, the Iranian government felt comfortable enough to ask Mossad to assassinate Khomeini, a request ultimately rejected by Mossad.
The situation changed after the 1979 revolution, when the new Iranian regime made hostility toward Israel a core element of its ideology. The irony? Mossad refused to assassinate Khomeini in 1979, but proceeded with the assassination of Ali Khamenei in 2026 in an airstrike. The question is whether, in the radically shifting geopolitical environment of the Middle East, Israel and Iran could join forces again against the common threat of a security alliance between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey.
Could Israel and Iran form a security alliance?
A security alliance between Israel and Iran may seem impossible. However, history is full of unexpected security alliances that seemed impossible until just a few months prior. In March 1979, just one month after the Iranian Revolution overturned friendly relations between Tehran and Tel Aviv, Israel achieved a major diplomatic feat by signing a security agreement with Egypt, with which it had fought in 1967. This was Israel's first security agreement with an Arab state. In September 2020, the United Arab Emirates signed the Abraham Accords, recognizing the state of Israel. The 2023 Saudi Arabia–Iran agreement was also extremely unlikely and came as a surprise. Similarly, in 1987, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to eliminate an entire category of nuclear and conventional missiles. This arms control treaty was considered impossible during the Cold War.
These examples show how leadership changes, external mediation, shifting strategic goals, or conflict fatigue can make agreements once deemed unfeasible possible. They also show that hard national interest can prevail over ideology. However, for an alliance between Israel and Iran to become possible, certain conditions must first be met.
First, no agreement between Israel and Iran is possible under the current Iranian regime, which has made hostility toward Israel a core component of its identity. For decades, Iran has supported non-state actors opposed to Israel, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Opposition to the US and Israel is a fundamental element of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) ideology. Therefore, a security agreement is unlikely as long as the same regime remains in power in Tehran. However, as seen in January of this year, the regime remains deeply unpopular and, once the threat of external attack fades, internal contradictions will return to the surface. In a post-IRGC political order, Tehran could find it in its interest to align with Israel. A nationalist government in Tehran that emphasizes its Persian identity rather than its revolutionary Islamic identity could align with Jerusalem to neutralize growing Saudi and Turkish influence in the region.
Second, if the emerging Saudi Arabia–Pakistan–Turkey alignment begins taking concrete steps to challenge or limit Iranian and Israeli influence across the region, both Tehran and Jerusalem will likely conclude that they need to create their own counter-alliances to balance this trilateral block. In such an alliance, Israel could offer high-tech weapons for defense, such as its combat-proven air defense systems, as well as its pan-Arab intelligence network. Iran, for its part, could offer energy security, a strategic geographical position, and a strong defense industrial base.
Such an alliance could remain secret and focus more on intelligence sharing rather than an explicit mutual defense commitment. However, the old security architecture in the Middle East has collapsed, and amid the prevailing uncertainty, new security alliances between unlikely partners could become the norm. The era of fixed blocs appears to have ended, and in this new environment, flexible and adaptive security alliances could emerge. The Middle East is now truly multipolar, with many axes and centers of power. In this fluid state, the possibility that even Israel and Iran—two sworn enemies—might eventually come together driven by mutual and transactional national interests should not be ruled out.
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