The US war with Iran may prove very different from what Washington planned.
The major problem for the United States is not merely how many missiles were launched, how many aircraft were lost, or how many billions of dollars will be needed to replenish ammunition.
The real strategic blow lies elsewhere: in the very capability of the USA to maintain its military footprint in the Middle East.
For decades, American power in the Persian Gulf relied on a vast network of bases, radar, air installations, ammunition depots, command centers, and naval infrastructure.
The war with Iran showed that this network is no longer invulnerable.
On the contrary, it constitutes a vast and predictable target.
And this is perhaps the most important lesson of the conflict.
John Mearsheimer: The USA may not return to Gulf bases
The distinguished American international relations theorist John Mearsheimer framed the issue in particularly harsh terms.
As he argued, Iran's ballistic missiles proved extremely effective and lethal against American military bases in the region, with nearly all having suffered severe damage or destruction.
This assessment carries special weight precisely because it does not originate from an Iranian official but from one of the most prominent American analysts of international politics.
Mearsheimer goes even further.
He considers it difficult to imagine that, after the war ends, the USA will want to reinvest massive amounts to rebuild its bases and return the military equipment that was removed or destroyed.
Even more importantly: he estimates that it is by no means certain that the Gulf countries themselves will want to host such a large number of American forces again.
This is the true strategic stake.
Because a base can be rebuilt.
What is not easily rebuilt is the confidence that the base can operate safely.
From «invulnerable sanctuary» to Iran's target
The American military network in the Gulf was designed under the assumption that the USA could use its bases as safe points of power projection.
The war with Iran overturned this assumption.
American facilities in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan, and other areas were targeted by Iranian missiles and drones.
Analyses based on satellite data have recorded damage to American military facilities across the region.
The problem is not merely whether a base can be hit.
The problem is that, from the moment the adversary can locate and repeatedly strike it, the base ceases to be a safe power projection platform.
This changes the entire strategic equation.
Washington can theoretically maintain the bases.
The question is whether it can use them effectively without being forced to allocate vast resources merely to protect them.
Al Udeid and Fifth Fleet: When the «nerves» of American power are struck
The significance of the damage becomes even greater when it concerns facilities that are not merely air bases.
Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar constitutes a central hub for American military presence in the Middle East.
In Bahrain lies the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet, one of the core pillars of American naval power in the region.
In Kuwait lie major support and staging facilities for American forces.
In other words, Iran does not need to destroy every American base to achieve a strategic effect.
It is enough to render the critical nodes of the American network unreliable.
This is very different from a classic military defeat.
It is a form of strategic attrition.
Iran also struck the American defense «umbrella»
An even more serious issue is that the attacks do not concern merely runways, hangars, or personnel facilities.
War analyses have highlighted damage to radar, early warning systems, and anti-missile infrastructure.
The destruction or degradation of such systems carries disproportionate significance.
A destroyed building can be rebuilt.
An aircraft can be replaced.
However, when the detection – warning – interception – command network is struck, the overall effectiveness of the American military presence diminishes.
And here appears one of Washington's major problems: the USA possesses vast military power, but that power requires infrastructure to function.
Iran struck precisely those infrastructures.
The second blow: The USA «burns» through its missile stockpiles
The problem of bases combines with a second, equally serious issue: missile stockpiles.
The data shows that the consumption of critical missile systems has created a massive gap between production and usage.
Patriot, THAAD, Tomahawk, ATACMS, PrSM, JASSM, and naval missiles SM-2/3/6 have been at the center of pressure.
The problem is that the American defense industry cannot replenish within a few months what was consumed in a prolonged war.
And here lies a critical asymmetry.
Iran can produce relatively cheaper offensive assets.
The USA must use extremely expensive interceptor missiles to counter them.
Thus, even when American air defense achieves an interception, the financial cost can be disproportionate.
Gerard Baker: Neither does economic pressure seem to bend Tehran
At this point, the assessment of Gerard Baker, columnist and former editor-in-chief of the Wall Street Journal, acquires special weight.
The conclusion attributed to Baker is extremely harsh toward Washington's strategy:
Economic pressure does not seem to force Iran into retreat.
At the same time, according to the same position, the Iranians do not appear willing to make concessions regarding the Strait of Hormuz, while the USA has already lost a significant portion of its missile stockpiles.
This creates a dangerous combination: America struggles to press Iran militarily, struggles to press it economically, and can no longer take control of its regional military network for granted.
Hormuz is the ultimate test
And at the center of everything lies the Strait of Hormuz.
It is the point where the military, energy, and economic dimensions of the war meet.
For the USA, control of the region is not merely a matter of military prestige.
It is a matter of global economic power.
If Tehran can maintain significant influence in the Strait while simultaneously threatening American bases and imposing costs on American forces, then Washington faces a strategic paradox:
it possesses the strongest military in the world, but struggles to convert that power into stable control over the Persian Gulf.
The major American problem: What happens after the war?
Here lies perhaps the most important question.
Not who won the next battle.
But who will be able to remain in the region after the war.
If the USA returns to its bases, it will have to invest massive amounts to rebuild and protect them.
It will have to strengthen anti-missile systems.
It will have to increase patrols.
It will have to protect supply lines.
It will have to maintain larger interceptor stockpiles.
And above all, it will have to accept that every major base in the Gulf can be a target.
This implies immense costs.
On the other hand, if Washington reduces its presence, a power vacuum is created.
And that vacuum will not remain empty for long.
Tehran may have achieved something greater than a military victory
This is perhaps the most dangerous conclusion for the USA.
Iran does not need to destroy the American military.
It does not need to sink American aircraft carriers.
It does not need to achieve total military victory.
It is enough to make the American presence in the Middle East prohibitively expensive, dangerous, and politically difficult.
If it succeeds, then the strategic balance shifts without requiring a classic battlefield defeat.
And this connects directly with John Mearsheimer's assessment that the USA may not choose to fully rebuild its bases, while neither are Gulf countries certain to desire the return of such a massive American military presence.
Washington's real «Waterloo»
If this development is confirmed, the major blow for the Donald Trump administration will not merely be losses in missiles or the billions required to replenish the American arsenal.
It will be the loss of strategic depth.
For decades, the USA could operate in the Middle East with a dense network of secure facilities at its disposal.
The war with Iran showed that this model has limits.
And if Tehran managed to prove that it can simultaneously threaten bases, radar, infrastructure, naval facilities, and energy routes, then the cost of American presence in the Gulf increases dramatically.
This is precisely the point where military conflict transforms into geopolitical defeat without requiring total military defeat.
The new big question
The critical question is no longer whether the USA can return to the Persian Gulf.
They can.
The question is whether they can return with the same level of military presence, at the same cost, and with the same sense of security.
And therein lies the major success that Tehran attempts to project:
Iran can emerge from a war not as the country that destroyed America, but as the country that proved it can make the American presence in the Middle East prohibitively expensive and dangerous.
If this becomes established, then the war will not have changed merely the balances around Iran.
It will have changed the entire security architecture of the Persian Gulf.
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