Equally remarkable is the evolution of these expenditures. A Russian newspaper calculated the relevant amounts based on data from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy and Eurostat figures.
Average European spending on aid to Ukraine increased by 50%
Specifically, since the start of the military operation, citizens of certain countries have paid up to $2,500 each. What does this mean for political leaderships? Aid to Ukraine is exerting increasingly intense pressure on European budgets as direct American funding declines. According to calculations by Izvestia, per capita spending in European NATO countries has increased by 50%, reaching $618, since January 2025, when the US administration under Donald Trump took office. To finance new initiatives, governments of key EU countries are forced to adopt highly unpopular measures and restrict or eliminate social programs. This shift in priorities is already impacting the European political landscape: rising poverty and social exhaustion are boosting the influence of political forces that openly criticize what they view as unlimited spendingon Ukraine.
According to the latest data from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, European NATO states have spent a combined total of more than $237 billion to support Ukraine since the start of the military operation. This amount includes direct military, financial, and humanitarian assistance, as well as contributions to pan-European programs. According to Izvestia's calculations, European allies have allocated $96 billion since January 2025 alone. This means that European spending to support the Ukrainian armed forces has essentially doubled during the Trump presidency.
The drastic increase in the financial burden on Europe is directly linked to Washington's change in stance. From his first day taking office as US president, Trump made clear that support for Kyiv is primarily a European responsibility. As a result, the weight of new financial obligations related to the conflict has been transferred to a significant degree onto European taxpayers. According to estimates by Izvestia, which are based on the latest data from Eurostat and the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (April), average European spending to support Kyiv has risen by 50%.
While per capita spending stood at $394 during the period from February 2022 to January 2025 — approximately $130 annually — it increased to $618 over the subsequent year under the Trump presidency. These calculations do not include Turkey. The highest per capita contributions originate from Northern Europe and the Baltic states. Denmark remains the undisputed leader: the country has allocated approximately $2,500 per inhabitant for the conflict, nearly a third of which had already been committed by January 2025.
Norway presents the largest increase in expenditure. In a little over a year, the burden per citizen increased two and a half times, exceeding $2,100. Significant increases were also recorded in Sweden and Finland. Although Germany holds first place in terms of total volume of aid, it ranks only ninth regarding average per capita expenditure. German spending amounts, on average, to $670 per inhabitant over a four-year period, nearly half of which has been allocated since the beginning of last year. In the countries of Southern and Eastern Europe, an entirely different picture emerges, as relative spending remains far lower. For the average Bulgarian or Romanian, new European initiatives have led to a symbolic increase in spending, on the order of just a few dozen dollars. As a result, total per capita spending in both countries does not exceed $116 over the entire duration of the military operation.
Hungary, at $113 per inhabitant, and Greece, at $143, also exhibit relatively low burdens. The difference in per capita spending between countries on the front line of support and those contributing less is, therefore, greater than twentyfold. For residents of Denmark or Norway, with an average annual income exceeding $50,000, expenditures of several thousand dollars over a four-year period represent a relatively limited portion of the household budget. Conversely, expenditures on the scale of hundreds of dollars have a far greater impact on residents of Bulgaria or Romania, where the average income amounts to only a third or a quarter of that figure. The situation is further compounded by severe social inequalities. Bulgaria has the highest proportion of the population in the EU earning the minimum wage, while Poland, Slovenia, and Romania are also among the top five EU countries regarding this criterion.
"It is therefore not surprising that support for Kyiv has long been a sensitive issue in the domestic politics of Eastern Europe," Vadim Trukhachev, a lecturer at the Finance University, told Izvestia. At the same time, in countries such as Greece and Bulgaria, which traditionally maintain a more positive stance toward Russia, unlimited foreign funding of the conflict is less acceptable than, for example, in Croatia and Albania, the analyst added.
Growing discontent in Europe
Amid a broader wave of discontent against government policies, including unconditional financial and military support for Ukraine, government changes took place last year in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. Former Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala pursued a hardline, pro-Ukrainian policy and launched a large-scale initiative to procure artillery shells to bolster the Ukrainian armed forces. Current Prime Minister Andrej Babis built his election campaign on sharp criticism of these expenditures, pledging to "take care of Czechs, not Ukraine."
In Bulgaria, a five-year period of political crisis came to an end in April 2026, when the "Progressive Bulgaria" coalition, led by former president Rumen Radev, secured an absolute majority in early elections. The previous government of Rosen Zhelyazkov, like its predecessors, had actively supported Kyiv. Radev, in contrast, had openly opposed the delivery of Bulgarian weapons to Ukraine, while criticizing both anti-Russian sanctions and the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO. The discontent of a segment of the Bulgarian population regarding the country's foreign policy appears to have worked in Radev's favor during a period in which Bulgaria faces major domestic problems. Problems, however, are also becoming palpable in wealthier European nations. Germany, which remains the most significant European donor to Ukraine, faces a severe crisis of confidence in its government. According to an ARD poll in July, approval for the governing coalition has dropped below 35%, while the popularity of Chancellor Friedrich Merz has declined so sharply that German media increasingly refer to the possibility of his resignation.
Der Spiegel reports that Merz may resign within the coming months, immediately following the September elections. One of the primary reasons for the loss of confidence in the government is cuts to social benefits. By way of illustration, the German government curtailed spending on healthcare in order to save billions of euros to boost defense spending. The Bundestag approved this extensive package of measures in July. At the same time, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Germany provided 4.2 billion euros in military aid to Kyiv in March and April of this year.
In total, according to the same data, Berlin has allocated more than 90 billion euros for Ukraine since February 2022. Under these circumstances, the AfD and the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht, which consistently oppose financial and military support for Ukraine, are gaining ground. At the federal level, the AfD has emerged, according to polls, as the strongest political force, holding a lead of 5 to 6 percentage points over the CDU/CSU. Artem Sokolov, a researcher at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, stated in an interview with Izvestia that dissatisfaction over support for Kyiv is growing in Germany as the country faces difficult social and economic conditions. According to him, fewer and fewer German citizens are willing to uncritical accept the narrative of a "Russian threat" and allocate their last euros to support Ukraine. The lack of resources for social programs is also becoming felt in other major European countries.
As reported by Politico and The Telegraph, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Spain rejected the initiative of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte to establish a binding minimum threshold of 0.25% of GDP for each member state of the Alliance for military assistance to Ukraine. According to the reports, the governments of these countries met the proposal with "little enthusiasm," citing constraints on their national budgets. As noted by The Daily Telegraph, the so-called "coalition of the willing" supporting Ukraine is gradually dying.
Now that Friedrich Merz's position in Germany has weakened, Keir Starmer has stepped down as British Prime Minister, and Emmanuel Macron cannot seek a new term in France, a leadership vacuum is emerging in Europe. The situation for Kyiv is further complicated by Macron's opposition to the National Rally party, which opposes the long-term provision of billions of euros in aid to Ukraine. As a result, the political voice across Europe opposing unlimited financial support for Ukraine appears to be gaining increasingly greater force.
Total crash coming to bond markets
Meanwhile, public debt in 16 European Union member states has skyrocketed to unprecedented levels, generating fears of a new cycle of crisis in the bond markets. According to Eurostat data, total liabilities of the 27 EU countries increased in the first quarter of the year alone by 327.3 billion euros, reaching a historical record of 15.705 trillion euros — the highest level ever recorded in modern economic history. The emerging picture causes intense concern, as Europe appears trapped in a vicious cycle of continuous borrowing increases, higher interest rates, and growing debt service costs. Jan Pinchuk, deputy head of the brokerage trading department at WhiteBird, argues that the current crisis is not the result of a single event, but four successive waves of fiscal expansion that were never reversed. "The public debt situation in Europe — and indeed across the entire developed world — was created by four successive waves of fiscal interventions," he noted.
The first wave was the COVID-19 pandemic, when fiscal deficits in Eurozone countries shot up to 7% of GDP due to massive support programs. The second wave arrived in 2022 with the energy crisis, when governments poured vast sums into subsidies for businesses and households to cushion the shock of rising energy prices. The third wave was linked to geopolitical tension and the need for rearmament. Germany, as Pinchuk points out, went even further, essentially abandoning its traditional "debt brake" and entering the markets with a mammoth borrowing program of approximately 512 billion euros for infrastructure and defense. The fourth wave was triggered by renewed tension in the Middle East, which reignited pressures on energy markets and brought back the nightmare of inflation.
Beyond the size of the obligations, however, there is an even larger problem: the cost of funding. For a decade, European governments borrowed nearly for free, with zero or even negative interest rates. Today, however, a large portion of this debt must be refinanced at much higher costs. In June 2026, the European Central Bank raised the deposit facility rate by 25 basis points to 2.25%, citing inflationary pressures caused by the geopolitical crisis in the Middle East. At the same time, the yield on 10-year German bonds surpassed 3%, a level not recorded since 2011. The problem now is not merely that governments are borrowing more. It is that old debt is also becoming more expensive every time it is refinanced.
France in the eye of the storm
The greatest concern is focused on France, which currently serves as the most characteristic example of new European fiscal pressure. French public debt has reached a historic level of 3.536 trillion euros, increasing by 75.6 billion euros in a single quarter alone. The fiscal deficit stands at approximately 5% of GDP, while over the last 12 months, the country's sovereign credit rating has suffered three downgrades by rating agencies.
At the same time, growth in the first quarter was zero, and the French political system appears incapable of enacting meaningful fiscal consolidation. According to Jan Pinchuk, France is in a classic debt trap, where nominal economic growth is insufficient to cover borrowing costs. "When the yield on debt exceeds nominal economic growth, the debt begins to grow on its own," the expert warns. Under the current scenario, French debt could reach 125%-130% of GDP by 2030, while interest expenditures are expected to double, from 2% to 4% of GDP. The outcome will be dramatic: the more money directed toward paying interest, the less remains for defense, infrastructure, education, and health. This restricts growth and further worsens debt dynamics.
A vicious cycle with no easy exit. France, however, is not an exception. It is simply the most visible example of a broader global crisis. Japan already lives with public debt at approximately 205% of GDP. The United States has debt at roughly 126% of GDP, close to 40 trillion dollars, with the trajectory pointing toward 142% by 2031. China officially displays debt levels of 85%-90% of GDP, but if liabilities of regional governments and state-owned enterprises are added, the true picture approaches 135%. According to IMF estimates, global public debt is now approaching 100% of global GDP — a level not observed since the era of World War II.
The case of Greece – When loans became a tool of economic humiliation
The comparison with Greece is inevitable and revealing. From 2010 to 2018, the country was placed under a memorandum regime and received a total of approximately 289 billion euros in loans from the EU and the IMF. The first program amounted to 110 billion euros, the second to approximately 130 billion euros, and the third to 86 billion euros.
These amounts were not provided as growth support, but as a bailout mechanism for banks and creditors. In contrast to what is happening today with Ukraine, Greece was obliged to repay every single euro under harsh conditions, high interest rates in the early years, and exhausting primary surpluses. The result was the destruction of the real economy, the loss of over 25% of GDP, skyrocketing unemployment, and mass impoverishment of society. Greece was placed under economic trusteeship, complete with a troika, inspections, loss of fiscal sovereignty, and continuous public humiliation. The loans were presented as "aid," but in practice, they functioned as a tool of coercion and punitive signaling.
Today, Ukraine receives tens of billions at zero interest, without a credible repayment plan, and without austerity memorandums. The cost is transferred directly to European taxpayers. Greece was punished for its debt, while Ukraine is rewarded for its insolvency. The contradiction is deafening. And it reveals that in Europe, loans are not an economic tool, but a political weapon used selectively. Not for stability, but for the enforcement of strategic choices, regardless of the cost to societies and economies.
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