A warning with direct threats against Ankara and personally Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was issued by the Defense Minister of Israel, Israel Katz.
The Israeli minister warned Turkey not to attempt to confront Israel, using historical references to the Ottoman Empire and the fall of Constantinople to underline his country's position.
In statements, Katz argued that Israel is not a power in decline, as "happened with the Byzantine Empire before the Fall of the City."
"We are not a collapsing Christian empire.
Jerusalem is not Constantinople, which you conquered when you founded the Ottoman Empire.
We are here forever. Jerusalem is ours forever.
We know how to defend ourselves and we are strong," signaled the Defense Minister of Israel.
The Defense Minister of Israel emphasized that his country considers Jerusalem of strategic and historical importance, declaring that Israel possesses the strength and capability to defend its interests.
"We are here forever.
Jerusalem is ours forever.
We know how to protect ourselves and we are strong," he stated.
Warning to Erdogan with reference to Iran
Israel Katz then addressed a direct message to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, likening the situation to the confrontation that preceded with Iran.
"Do not mess with us.
My advice to Erdogan is not to mess with us and not to find himself in the position in which Iran brought itself.
He still has plenty of leeway to avoid it," he stated.
Closing his statement, he called on the Turkish president to focus on Turkey's internal affairs, noting that Israel will continue to defend its own interests.
"Let him take care of Turkey and its own issues.
We will take care of our own interests and will continue to do so," emphasized the Defense Minister of Israel.
The strategic approach of Greece and Israel is systematically presented in Greek public debate as a self-evident success of foreign policy and the Greek government despite the opposing view of both the political system and Greek public opinion.
Cooperation in armaments, joint military exercises, energy security, and intelligence services appears as a factor of stability and as an indirect counterweight against Turkey.
This picture is, however, completely mistaken.
The deepening of the Greek-Israeli relationship takes place during a period in which the entire Middle East is reordering itself, the Israel–Turkey confrontation is expanding, and Washington is trying to keep under its control two regional powers which, for its interests, are simultaneously useful and competitive.
Israel's strategic bridgehead
Within this environment, Greece risks being transformed from a relatively autonomous regional actor into a strategic bridgehead for Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean.
This does not mean that a Greco-Turkish war is imminent or inevitable.
It means, however, that Athens is increasingly linking its security with the choices of a power whose armed conflicts, regional ambitions, and confrontations extend far beyond Greek interests.
The Israel–Turkey confrontation is not (yet) existential
Despite the harsh rhetoric of recent years, neither Turkey nor Israel currently constitutes an immediate existential threat to one another.
Their relations are much older and deeper than public confrontation suggests.
Turkey recognized Israel in 1949 and was the first Muslim-majority state to do so.
For decades, the two countries developed close military, commercial, and intelligence cooperation.
Even during the Erdogan period, when diplomatic relations collapsed repeatedly, economic and strategic ties proved more resilient than rhetoric.
Ankara officially severed direct trade with Israel in May 2024, but energy and regional interdependence did not disappear.
Today's Israeli-Turkish conflict is not only about Gaza or the ideological rivalry between the Netanyahu and Erdogan governments.
It primarily concerns the shift in the balance of power in Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus, and Western Asia.
Turkey possesses a large war machine, a growing defense industry, geographic depth, access to the Black Sea, and influence in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Syria, Libya, and the Balkans.
Its value to the USA and NATO is not diminishing, on the contrary, it is increasing.
This constitutes the deeper problem for Israel.
The Israeli leadership is not only concerned about a potential military conflict with Turkey.
It is concerned that the increase in Turkish influence will limit its own regional freedom of movement.
In June 2026, Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that Israeli operations in Syria and Lebanon had reached a point of threatening Turkey's security as well.
He even linked Israeli activity to Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, warning of a strong Turkish response in case of violation of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot interests.
This reference directly concerns Greece.
Greece as the western edge of a new regional disposition.
The military and operational dimension of the alliance – How dependence on Israel takes shape
The relationship between Greece and Israel is no longer limited to diplomacy or energy. It has acquired a clear military and operational dimension.
The defense cooperation program for 2026 includes 29 actions in Greece and 25 in Israel.
The two sides also agreed on the exchange of know-how for countering unmanned aircraft, drone swarms, and underwater unmanned systems.
At the same time, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel decided to increase joint air and naval exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Cooperation includes maritime security, training, exchange of know-how, and strengthening the protection of energy and strategic infrastructure.
The greatest shift concerns, however, the dependence of Greek air defense on Israeli systems.
In July 2026, the purchase of a multi-layered air defense system worth up to 3.5 billion euros, the so-called "Achilles Shield", was approved. At the core of the system are Israeli radars and missiles from Rafael and Israel Aerospace Industries.
Greece has also procured Israeli missile artillery systems and unmanned aircraft, while operating an air training center on Greek territory in cooperation with Israel.
From a purely military perspective, these procurements can significantly enhance Greek deterrence.
Greece needs modern anti-missile, anti-aircraft, and anti-drone protection.
The critical issue, however, is not only who manufactures the weapons. It is the overall web of dependency that is created: maintenance, upgrades, software, spare parts, technical support, intelligence, and operational interoperability.
The deeper Israeli systems are integrated into Greek defense, the harder it becomes for Athens to separate its defense policy from Israel's overall strategy.
The alliance lacks an automatic mechanism for protecting Greece
Greece views Israel as an indirect counterweight against Turkey.
However, it is not certain that Israel would jeopardize its own relations with Ankara to support Greece in a Greco-Turkish crisis.
There is no published Greek-Israeli mutual defense treaty.
Joint exercises, weapons contracts, and intelligence sharing do not equate to a guarantee of military assistance.
Israel will act based on its own interests.
If in a crisis it considers that maintaining channels with Turkey is more important than supporting Greek positions in the Aegean or the Eastern Mediterranean, it may choose neutrality, mediation, or even a temporary understanding with Ankara.
The history of Turkish-Israeli relations shows that periods of intense hostility can be followed by sudden rapprochement.
Greek policy cannot rely on the assumption that current Israel–Turkey confrontation is permanent.
Athens therefore risks incurring the political cost of an anti-Turkish stance without possessing a corresponding Israeli guarantee for the hour of crisis.
American strategy needs both Turkey and Israel
The United States, on the other hand, does not desire a definitive rift between Turkey and Israel.
They need Israel as their primary military and political ally in the Middle East, but they also need Turkey as a key pillar of NATO in the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East.
Turkey is not a state that Washington can easily replace with Greece, for those who know how to objectively calculate the balance of forces.
The size of the Turkish armed forces, geographic location, access to the Black Sea, borders with Syria, Iraq, and Iran, presence in the Caucasus, and a growing war industry accord Ankara a role that Greece cannot replicate.
The NATO Summit in Ankara in July 2026 reconfirmed Turkey's importance for the Alliance's southern and eastern flank.
The Ankara Declaration focused on increasing defense spending, strengthening war production, and continuing military support to Ukraine.
In the event of an intense Greco-Turkish crisis, the most likely American response would not be unconditional support for Greece.
It would be an immediate effort at de-escalation, preventing a split in NATO, and keeping Turkey within the Western camp.
This means that Greece should not confuse a close defense relationship with the USA and Israel with automatic geopolitical protection.
The real danger is an uncontrolled hot incident
The Greece–Israel alliance is not going by itself to cause a generalized Greco-Turkish war.
Greece and Turkey still possess political dialogue mechanisms, while in the meeting of their leaders in February 2026 they reiterated the desire to manage their differences and strengthen economic relations.
Fundamental disagreements over maritime zones and the Turkish casus belli, however, remained unresolved.
The greatest danger stems from a sequence of smaller events:
1) an Israeli-Turkish confrontation in Syria,
2) a crisis in the Cypriot EEZ,
3) Turkish obstruction of a research or energy project,
4) the use of Greek facilities for Israeli operations,
5) the provision of Greek data or infrastructure during a conflict period,
6) an air or naval incident in the Eastern Mediterranean,
7) the deployment of Israeli military systems in Cyprus.
Each of these incidents can be considered limited.
In combination, however, they can create a situation in which Greece will be forced to choose sides.
The most dangerous scenario is not for Israel to officially ask Greece to fight Turkey.
It is for Greek infrastructure, bases, surveillance systems, or intelligence to be used in the context of an Israeli-Turkish conflict and for Ankara to consider Greece a participant.
In modern warfare, participation does not begin only with sending soldiers. It can begin with providing intelligence, granting airspace, refueling, technical support, facilities at bases, or operating joint surveillance systems.
Cyprus as the most likely field of escalation
Cyprus constitutes the most vulnerable link of the trilateral cooperation between Greece, Cyprus, and Israel.
For Turkey, Cyprus does not constitute a secondary foreign policy issue.
It is linked to national security, military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, maritime claims, and the legitimization of the Turkish Cypriot regime.
The growing Israeli presence in the Republic of Cyprus can be interpreted by Ankara not as simple defense cooperation, but as part of a regional mechanism for containing Turkey.
In the event of a crisis in Cyprus, Greece could hardly remain neutral.
The pressure for military, diplomatic, or material support to Nicosia would be huge.
At the same time, Israel would seek the protection of its own infrastructure, maritime corridors, and strategic interests.
Thus, a conflict that started as a Turkish Cypriot or Israeli-Turkish confrontation could gradually acquire a direct Greco-Turkish dimension.
From deterrence to strategic dependence
Greece needs strong armed forces. It needs modern air defense, drones, missile systems, cyber defense, and effective surveillance of the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean.
It does not follow, however, that the country's security requires uncritical political alignment with Israel.
The procurement of Israeli weapons can act as a deterrent against Turkey. The transformation, however, of Greece into a permanent operational, energy, and diplomatic pillar for Israel can create new threats.
The balance is delicate.
As long as cooperation remains defensive, controlled exclusively by the Greek side, and does not allow the use of Greek infrastructure in offensive operations, it can strengthen Greek security.
If, however, Greece becomes integrated into a broader Israeli plan to contain Turkey, Iran, or other regional powers, then the country assumes risks that do not correspond to its own national interests.
The need for a truly multi-dimensional Greek policy
Greek foreign policy must avoid the illusion of "permanent allies".
Greece needs functional relations with Israel, but also with Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, and the Palestinian authorities.
It also needs stable communication channels with Turkey, regardless of the depth of their differences.
Full alignment with Israel can limit Greek relations with the Arab and Muslim world, damage the country's image as a power of dialogue, and expose Greece to the consequences of Israeli choices over which it possesses no substantive control.
Athens must therefore define clear red lines:
The Greek territory must not be used for offensive operations against third states.
The Greek armed forces must not be integrated into Israeli regional planning that is not directly linked to the defense of Greece.
Israeli weapons systems must be under full Greek operational and technical control.
Cooperation with Israel must not substitute for the need for domestic defense production and technological autonomy.
Greece must maintain an independent position on the Palestinian issue and not identify the security of Israel with support for every policy of the Israeli government.
Geopolitical shifts in the Middle East and horror scenarios
The shift in the balance of power in the Middle East brings Turkey and Israel into increasing competition.
Greece is positioning itself deeper and deeper on the Israeli side of this confrontation, believing that in this way it enhances its deterrence against Turkey.
This choice may offer short-term military and diplomatic benefits. It does not, however, constitute free security.
Greece risks being transformed into an advanced base of a regional competition it does not control. And while Israel can use Greece as strategic depth against Turkey, there is no certainty that it will defend Greek positions when its own interests require an understanding with Ankara.
The immediate risk of a pre-planned Greco-Turkish war remains limited.
The risk, however, of a gradual and uncontrolled entanglement is increasing.
The threat is not found only in an official military alliance. It is found in the accumulation of armaments dependencies, joint infrastructure, operational interoperability, and political commitments that, at a moment of crisis, can dramatically limit Greece's freedom of choices.
Real Greek deterrence cannot rely on the expectation that Israel, the USA, or any other power will fight on behalf of the country.
It must rely on national defense capability, diplomatic autonomy, maintaining multiple regional relations, and, above all, avoiding the transformation of Greece into an attachment of a foreign strategy, let alone that of an internationally condemned genocidal state.
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