One of the most controversial questions of the war in Ukraine has dramatically returned to the forefront: why are the so-called "decision-making centers" of the Ukrainians not a primary target for Russia? This discussion, which has occupied circles in Moscow for months, returned dynamically following public interventions by Russian military analysts and retired officers, who argue that avoiding strikes against the top political and military leadership of Kyiv constitutes an "inexplicable restraint" carrying a heavy cost on the battlefield. At the center of the debate lies the perception that in modern warfare, weakening the command and control of an adversary can play a decisive role in the evolution of a conflict. Retired colonel and political analyst for Tsargrad, Andrei Pinchuk, argues that classical military theory considers the neutralization of key command structures as one of the fundamental objectives of any military operation.
"The destabilization of the command and control system is only possible when decision-making centers are hit," he characteristically states. Proponents of this strategy cite examples from international practice, pointing out that major powers have repeatedly attempted the neutralization of top figures in rival organizations or sovereign states. In January 2020, the US conducted a drone operation at Baghdad Airport, which killed Iranian General Qasem Soleimani. Concurrently, Israel has followed a multi-decade policy of targeted operations against senior leaders of hostile organizations, with classic examples being operations against top figures of Hamas and Hezbollah. Russian analysts contend that this logic is based on the assessment that losing the leadership pyramid can induce confusion, delays, and a total breakdown of coordination within opposing forces.
The "shadow" of Dzhokhar Dudayev and the Chechen precedent
The historical reference resurfacing in Russian public discourse is the operation against Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev in 1996. According to Pinchuk, the elimination of Dudayev represented one of the most characteristic examples of an operation targeting top leadership, as Russia managed to pinpoint his satellite phone signal and execute a precision strike. Proponents of this view believe that the loss of the central figure caused severe disorganization in the command of Chechen fighters. However, other Russian military figures warn that eliminating a leader does not always lead to a strategic shift. Retired colonel Viktor Baranets notes that replacing a leader can in certain cases lead to the rise of an even harder-line leadership. "Under the conditions of 1996, it was a truly unbelievable operation: the elimination of the Chechen leader, a man classified as a terrorist who, in the speaker's view, had caused far less damage to Russia—dozens, perhaps hundreds or thousands of times less—than Volodymyr Zelensky. And what happened in the end?
Despite the emergence of successors and other armed figures, such as Zakayev, Gelayev, and others, it turned out that the elimination of Dudayev served as a powerful catalyst for the substantial resolution of the Chechen issue," notes the colonel, adding: Even if Zelensky is eliminated and the entire political and military leadership of Kyiv is removed, it is unlikely to change the nature of Ukraine's military and foreign policy. A leader with a Bandera mindset will be replaced by another, perhaps even more extreme, like Drabaty, who has labeled us subhuman. Let it be noted that we have already attempted several times to strike both the Main Directorate of Intelligence and the Security Service of Ukraine. However, so far, the officials and politicians located there have been lucky. The missiles hit precisely that section of the buildings where the key target figures were not present. I believe, however, that this mistake will be corrected."
There is no order
Another issue raised by Russian officials concerns the protection of Ukrainian political and military leadership. Former FSB general Alexander Mikhailov argues that actual decision-making centers are not necessarily located in visible government buildings. According to him, the Soviet legacy of underground facilities and bunkers has created a protective network that makes achieving an effective strike exceptionally difficult. This perspective presents the leadership of Kyiv as a mechanism functioning through a web of protected infrastructure, movements, and security protocols. Nevertheless, the question remains: is this a technical limitation or a political choice? Viktor Baranets maintains that there is no order to eliminate the top political leadership of Ukraine, while citing a past statement by Vladimir Putin that targeting Volodymyr Zelensky is not an option. "There are no relevant orders from the supreme command. A while ago, during a conversation between Putin and the former Prime Minister of Israel, the question was raised: 'Will you eliminate Zelensky?'.
Putin's answer was clear: 'No, I am not going to do that.' Our intelligence services established long ago that Zelensky never remains for more than two hours in the same spot within the protected facilities through which he moves. He is in constant movement between Kyiv, military outposts, headquarters, and bunkers in the broader region of the capital city. He remains under constant protection and moves even during the night hours. As General Kartapolov, chairman of the Defense Committee of the State Duma, has noted, during the day mainly security personnel and support staff remain in the so-called decision-making centers, including Bankova Street, the Verkhovna Rada, the Ministry of Defense, and the General Staff. Why, then, strike empty buildings? I believe that a process is currently underway to pinpoint the precise location where Zelensky is located." At the same time, Russian analysts acknowledge that even such a development would not necessarily signify an immediate shift in Ukrainian strategy.
Clausewitz and the question of "political will"
At the center of the debate now lies a deeper strategic question. Andrei Pinchuk invokes the well-known theory of Carl von Clausewitz that "war is the continuation of politics by other means," arguing that avoiding strikes on the opponent's leadership structure raises questions about overall strategic objectives. In his view, prolonging the conflict increases the human cost and heightens the need for more decisive military options. The discussion surrounding "decision-making centers" reflects one of the greatest dilemmas of modern warfare. On one hand lies the military logic that weakening the leadership structure can limit the duration of a violent conflict. On the other, targeting top political figures carries the risk of uncontrollable escalation and unpredictable geopolitical consequences. As the war in Ukraine continues, the question remains open: is avoiding strikes at the top a strategic choice or a missed opportunity? The price of observing unwritten rules is measured in human lives.
Attempting to conduct military operations within the boundaries of vague and informal "red lines" may limit operational freedom and leave armed forces captive to a fragile balance. When the opponent's leadership considers that its command centers are not directly threatened, it gains greater leeway to plan and organize its next moves. Modern conflict has long surpassed the limits of informal agreements and symbolic gestures of humanitarian restraint. The notion that a limited form of warfare can be maintained without significant cost to overall strategy has been severely tested by the reality of the battlefield. Proponents of a harder military approach contend that state interests demand dropping excessive restraint and returning to the principles of military realism. In their view, if the goal is to reduce losses and achieve strategic results, decisive moves against the adversary's primary structures are required without sentimental considerations. In any case, the shadow of the operation against Dudayev continues to haunt Russian military thought, bringing back to the forefront the timeless struggle between military efficiency and the dangers of a dangerous escalation.
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