In March, Israeli F-35s struck three locations in central Syria that Turkish planners had quietly selected for the creation of a future airbase. No Turkish soldiers had been stationed there yet—Ankara had not even completed the necessary procedures. But the message did not need translation: Israel prefers to pre-emptively bomb an area rather than allow Turkish forces to operate from it. Ankara absorbed the blow and abandoned the deployment plan, choosing not to retaliate.
This single, barely publicized decision—accepting an attack on territory it had not yet occupied by a state that the Turkish president now systematically accuses of genocide—reveals more about the chances of a Turkish-Israeli war than any speech by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan or any Israeli minister this year. Two of the strongest militaries in the region find themselves close enough to an armed conflict that one is bombing the future infrastructure of the other in advance. Yet, no one has pulled the trigger just yet.
From strategic partners to rivals in Syria
Turkey and Israel were, for decades, quiet partners in the security sector, cooperating on intelligence and defense contracts despite periodic diplomatic crises. This relationship collapsed after October 2023, while Ankara fully suspended trade with Israel in May 2024, causing a rift that equates to roughly $7 billion annually for the two economies. The vacuum created after the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 essentially reignited the conflict.
Turkey supports the new government in Damascus under Ahmed al-Sharaa and seeks a strong, centralized Syrian state on its border, partly to complete its multi-year battle against the Kurdish insurgency. Israel seeks the opposite: a fragmented and weak Syria, incapable of hosting hostile forces. Since the fall of Assad, Israel has struck Syrian territory roughly three times more frequently than in the previous seven years combined.
In December, Israel formalized a security agreement with Greece and Cyprus during a meeting in Jerusalem, which Turkish officials interpreted as a deliberate strategic encirclement. The only element keeping the rivalry below the threshold of war is a technical de-escalation channel established by the two militaries through Azerbaijani mediation in 2025. Both governments insist, with particular emphasis, that this channel is not a step toward normalizing relations.
Turkey is not ready for war
If one strips away the rhetoric, the reality is different: Turkey cannot currently fight Israel and win—and the Turkish General Staff knows it. The highly publicized "Steel Dome," the Turkish air defense shield promised by Erdoğan, is not expected to be operational before 2030. The Altay main battle tank, presented as a symbol of Turkish military self-sufficiency, has just three units in active service.
The fleet of Turkish F-16s requires upgrades that necessitate the approval of the United States, an approval that Washington has delayed precisely due to concerns over where the aircraft will be utilized. The fifth-generation Kaan fighter and the Kızılelma drone constitute real programs and not mere announcements, but they are still years away from establishing a meaningful numerical presence. The 30% increase in the Turkish defense budget sounds significant until compared with domestic inflation, which runs at nearly the same levels. None of this is unknown to Ankara. This is why Turkish officials describe the de-escalation line through Azerbaijan as "completely technical" rather than rejecting it; they need it just as much as Israel does.
The real danger is not a planned war
Here lies the point where many analyses miss the core dynamic of the confrontation. The danger is not that Erdoğan will decide one morning to order an attack. His government, despite the harsh rhetoric, has been careful to never translate words into troop movements against Israeli forces.
Ankara has defined its red lines differently:
-
A large-scale Israeli occupation in southern Syria.
-
A direct threat to the survival of the al-Sharaa government.
-
A collapse of the talks regarding the integration of the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the national Syrian army.
All three scenarios share a common characteristic: none requires Turkey to directly attack Israel. They describe conditions under which Turkey might feel compelled to deploy troops inside Syria—a space where the Israeli air force already operates freely and where Israel proved in March that it will strike first and explain later.
The scenario of an accidental conflict
The strongest argument against the view that a war between Turkey and Israel is "unlikely" is a tangible one. Two ideologically opposed regional powers, with expanding defense industries and the conviction that the other is encroaching upon their own sphere of influence, form a classic recipe for a conflict that neither side desires. History has shown that insecure and rising powers can clash on their borders even when they do not plan to do so.
However, this case differs. Both militaries are already operating inside a third country under an active de-escalation mechanism, while a common external factor exists—Washington—which has a strong incentive to prevent a clash between a NATO member and a key regional security partner. This combination does not eliminate the risk; it simply shifts it from a planned Turkish-Israeli war to an accidental conflict that could be triggered by developments in Syria that neither Ankara nor Jerusalem fully controls.
The deadline for the integration of the SDF constitutes the most characteristic example. If it fails and Turkey moves forces toward areas controlled by the YPG—the Kurdish militia at the core of the SDF, which Ankara considers a Syrian branch of the PKK—then Turkish and Israeli forces will find themselves in the same disputed space for the first time. What has transpired since March essentially serves as a rehearsal for this exact scenario, according to an analysis by Modern Diplomacy.
The potential scenarios
Baseline scenario – probability around 65% The shadow rivalry continues just as it has over the past year, with rhetoric escalating on both sides. Erdoğan needs the anti-Israeli stance for the domestic audience, particularly as he manages Turkey's economy and prepares for the 2028 elections. Israeli officials have also stopped pretending to seek diplomatic moderation. The de-escalation line remains active because both militaries have more to lose from its collapse than from its use, and no direct conflict is recorded through 2027.
Negative scenario The integration of the SDF into the Syrian army officially collapses, and Turkey moves special forces or allied proxy forces toward Kurdish areas in northeastern Syria, which Israel quietly supports. An Israeli strike aimed at protecting this relationship kills forces connected to Turkey. These do not necessarily have to be official Turkish soldiers, but politically, the distinction might not matter. Erdoğan will face pressure for the first time to respond with more than just statements. The most likely outcome will not be a major war, but a limited symbolic response, probably against a Syrian target rather than Israeli territory. This is the scenario that many underestimate.
Positive scenario A real ceasefire in Gaza that is maintained through 2026, combined with pressure from Washington on both sides, could lead to an upgrade of the de-escalation line and a partial resumption of Turkish-Israeli trade. This would not occur out of goodwill, but due to Turkey's need to combat inflation and secure defense supply chains that are currently impacted by sanctions. The rhetoric will not disappear, but it will become increasingly decoupled from political action.
What the world needs to watch
The question of "how likely is a war between Turkey and Israel?" does not have an easy answer. It is not particularly likely as a conscious choice by either government, but it is dangerously possible as an accident that neither side would choose. The rhetoric is real, but it is not the mechanism driving events. The divergence in Turkey's military capabilities and its dependence on the de-escalation line with Israel currently act as stronger deterrents than any diplomatic effort.
What can truly alter the picture is not another speech by Erdoğan; it is what happens inside Syria, and specifically around the integration of the SDF into the national army of al-Sharaa. This is the critical variable to watch in the coming months. If the process collapses and Turkish-backed forces move into areas that Israel is arming, then the shadow rivalry will cease to be in the shadows. Everything else is simply noise.
www.bankingnews.gr
Readers’ Comments