Recep Tayyip Erdogan is abandoning words and moving toward the institutional shielding of revisionism, turning the doctrine of the "Blue Homeland" into a law of the Turkish state, reports the well-known Turkish analyst Sinan Ciddi in an article for the Middle East Forum. As he notes, this escalation is not merely a bureaucratic move, but a deliberate strategy of "trapping" Greece, which limits the margins for diplomacy and brings the two countries closer than ever to a fatal conflict. Specifically, according to Sinan Ciddi, Turkey seeks once again to alter the maritime borders of the Eastern Mediterranean.
According to a recent report by Bloomberg, says Sinan Ciddi, Ankara is preparing legislation to safeguard its claims in disputed maritime zones in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. The proposed legislation reportedly incorporates into Turkish law the long-standing doctrine of the "Blue Homeland" (Mavi Vatan), institutionalizing expanded claims that overlap with the exclusive economic zones claimed by Greece and Cyprus. The "Blue Homeland" projects a maximalist interpretation of Turkey's maritime borders, which contradicts established maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Through television stations, the printed press, and social media, various figures, from high-ranking military officers to government officials and analysts, project maps of the "Blue Homeland," leading many Turks to believe that this revisionist interpretation of Turkish maritime borders is indeed real and acceptable. Although Ankara's new legislative initiative may initially seem technical or bureaucratic, it represents a deliberate and carefully calculated escalation by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This action aims to challenge the regional order in the Eastern Mediterranean, to exert pressure on neighboring states, and to position Turkey as the dominant naval power between Europe and the Middle East.
The timing of this plan is particularly inappropriate. The Eastern Mediterranean constitutes one of the most militarized and politically unstable regions of Europe. The conflict in Gaza, increased tensions between Israel and Iran, instability in Syria, and great power competition have heightened regional concerns. By attempting to institutionalize extensive maritime claims that run contrary to international legal norms, Ankara risks turning long-standing disputes into a much more dangerous confrontation, Ciddi notes.
At the heart of the problem lies Turkey's rejection of the modern international framework for the law of the sea. Ankara is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the legal framework that regulates maritime rights and exclusive economic zones. The United States is also not a party; however, successive American administrations comply with it and respect it because it is based on common and established naval law. Turkey, conversely, argues that Greek islands located near Turkish coasts should not possess full maritime zones, particularly islands such as Kastellorizo, which is situated just a few miles from the southern coasts of Turkey. In contrast, Greece and Cyprus insist that the islands are entitled to full maritime rights under international law.
Even if Turkey considers that it possesses a legal basis for its claims, it has promoted them less through diplomacy and more through aggressive rhetoric and open military threats against Greece and Cyprus. In recent years, Turkey has repeatedly used naval deployments, seismographic vessels, and military escorts to challenge Greek and Cypriot claims. Turkish research vessels operating in disputed waters have frequently caused crises with Athens and Nicosia. In 2020, the mission of the Turkish research vessel Oruç Reis in disputed waters, says the Turkish analyst, brought Greece and Turkey, both NATO allies, to the brink of military conflict.
The current risk of escalation is undeniably greater compared to the past. Unlike previous incidents, Turkey now seeks to institutionalize these claims through parliamentary legislation. This development is significant because it limits Erdogan's flexibility for compromises and reinforces the logic of confrontation as an element of state policy. Once such claims are legally codified, overturning them becomes politically costly domestically and strategically difficult internationally. Furthermore, Ankara's actions go beyond maritime border issues and are part of a broader revisionist foreign policy that Turkey has been pursuing in multiple regions over the last decade.
The example of Libya
According to Ciddi, Turkey's intervention in Libya in 2019 offers an instructive example. Ankara's military support for the Government of National Accord based in Tripoli was not merely ideological or geopolitical. In exchange for military support, Turkey secured a maritime zone delimitation agreement with Libya, which dramatically expanded Turkish claims in the Mediterranean, ignoring Greek maritime zones. In its most extreme version, the agreement even ignored the existence of the Greek island of Crete. The European Union and regional states condemned the agreement as legally questionable and destabilizing.
Similarly, Turkey has combined maritime claims with military coercion in other contexts as well. Ankara has deployed drones, naval forces, and missile systems in the Eastern Mediterranean, while simultaneously intensifying nationalist rhetoric against Greece and Cyprus. Erdogan has threatened Greece that Turkey could "come suddenly one night," a statement that many Greek officials interpret as a military threat. This combination of legal revisionism and military display of power creates a dangerous environment.
The risk of accidental or deliberate conflict between Greece and Turkey is now a serious concern. Both countries maintain strong armed forces in close proximity in the Aegean. Airspace violations, incidents of tracking naval units, and competitive military exercises occur frequently. A clash, a miscalculation, or a politically motivated escalation could quickly evolve into a broader crisis involving NATO and the European Union.
Cyprus constitutes an unstable flashpoint. Turkey is the only country that recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and maintains tens of thousands of soldiers on the island following the 1974 invasion. Ankara increasingly links maritime disputes with Cyprus's energy exploration activities, threatening companies and states that cooperate with the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus.
The most significant consequences go beyond regional tensions. Turkey's actions undermine energy cooperation projects that could contribute to Europe's energy security amidst great geopolitical uncertainty. These actions discourage investments, weaken diplomatic coordination, and intensify distrust between NATO allies at a time when Western cohesion is already under pressure. Ankara's stance is also likely to undermine its efforts to present itself as a new trade and energy corridor, as evidenced by its plans for promoting the "Middle Corridor" and the "Iraq Development Road."
The ideological framework supporting Turkish naval doctrine also causes concern. The concept of the "Blue Homeland" does not merely constitute a defensive naval strategy; it reflects an increasingly nationalist and neo-imperialist worldview promoted by Erdogan and parts of Turkey's military and political establishment. This doctrine envisions Turkey as a dominant regional power with the right to project influence over extensive maritime areas, from the Black Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean. This ambition brings Ankara onto a collision course not only with Greece and Cyprus, but also with other regional state actors.
Supporters of Turkey argue that Ankara is defending its legitimate interests against attempts to exclude it from the energy arrangements of the Eastern Mediterranean. While it is accurate that regional groupings often exclude Turkey, coercion and legal revisionism are not productive alternatives to diplomacy, the Turkish analyst writes. Instead of promoting regional integration, Turkey's actions risk intensifying its isolation.
In a period where the Eastern Mediterranean needs de-escalation, energy coordination, and security cooperation, Ankara seems determined to provoke yet another crisis. The risk is that the Erdogan government may believe that confrontation serves Turkey's interests by mobilizing nationalist sentiments domestically and extracting international concessions. Erdogan seeks re-election for a fourth presidential term, but he will need to show creativity to attract Turkish voters who are dissatisfied with his economic management. Heightening tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean is a proven method that is likely to convince some hesitant voters.
Turkey's repeated escalations in the Eastern Mediterranean have created distrust, led to the creation of counter-alliances, and caused growing concern within NATO regarding Ankara's long-term course. Institutionalizing disputed maritime claims through legislation carries the risk of entrenching these divisions for years to come. In one of the most geopolitically fragile regions of the world, such a risk is something the region can hardly afford, Ciddi concludes.
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