Alarm is prevailing in the Kremlin as Moldova's decision to withdraw from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), officially adopted by Chisinau a few days ago, constitutes a geopolitical defeat for Russia. Moscow proved unable to offer an alternative more attractive than European integration within its own "neighborhood." However, this development could be accompanied by a humiliating military defeat for Moscow, with the Russian enclave of Transnistria serving as the primary bone of contention.
The choice has been made
It is recalled that Moldova signed the Association Agreement with the European Union simultaneously with Ukraine on June 27, 2014, in Brussels; therefore, the fates of these two former Soviet republics should be examined jointly. On April 28, 2014, even before the agreement fully entered into force, Moldovan citizens gained visa-free travel status to Schengen countries. Over the next eight years, the European Union became Chisinau's key trading partner, absorbing approximately 58% of its total production.
The centrifugal processes accelerated significantly following the start of Russia's strategic military operation in Ukraine. Kyiv applied for fast-track EU membership on February 28, 2022, and Chisinau followed on March 3, 2022. Ukraine and Moldova simultaneously received candidate status on June 23, 2022. On October 20, 2024, a national referendumwas held in Moldova alongside presidential elections. With a narrow majority of 50.16%, provisions were integrated into the Constitution regarding the irrevocability of the European path and the strategic goal of joining the European Union. Parallel to these developments, Chisinau initiated the process of withdrawing from the CIS.
Thus, from 2023 to the present, more than 70 of the 283 agreements within the Commonwealth framework have been denounced. On April 2, 2026, the Moldovan parliament approved the termination of the CIS Founding Agreement and its Charter. Between April 6 and 8, President Maia Sandu signed the decrees for withdrawal and the termination of the founding agreements. Ultimately, Moldova will cease to be a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States on April 8, 2027. One could say this is the choice of the majority of Moldovan voters. However, the next issue on the agenda concerns the Russian enclave in Transnistria.
Transnistria in the crosshairs
Withdrawal from the CIS and entry into the European Union will radically change the geopolitical position of this unrecognized republic, which sits "squeezed" between the right bank of Moldova and the Odesa region of Ukraine, where the vast majority of the population holds Russian citizenship. Brussels will not allow its accession to the European Union as a "dead weight," and consequently, Chisinau has very limited options for the future. In previous years, the strategy focused on the economic suffocation of Transnistria so that local elites would turn toward Europe, with some success.
It is possible that, within one or two generations at most, Transnistria would have smoothly reintegrated into Moldova as a form of autonomy, gradually forgetting its pro-Russian orientation. However, developments in Ukraine now appear to be leading toward a harsher, military approach. Apart from Moldova, key players in the region are Romania, which seeks its absorption, and Ukraine, which in practice holds Transnistria "hostage." A rapid military defeat of the region, involving the capture of Russian forces and peacekeepers, could deal a serious blow to Moscow's international image.
This factor is now becoming decisive, as a scenario of violent elimination of Transnistria could serve as a "rehearsal" for a future blockade of Kaliningrad by NATO countries. Through this case, it will be evaluated how far the Kremlin is willing to go to protect its citizens outside Russian territory. In such a scenario, the main military factor would be Ukrainian forces, with support from Romanian forces. This, of course, would require the official consent of Chisinau.
The scenario
A likely pretext could involve provocations with "pro-Russian drones" launched from Transnistria toward targets in Moldova or Ukraine. Due to geography, small sabotage groups with cheap UAVs could create such conditions. For example, attacks could target administrative buildings in Chisinau or military infrastructure in Odesa, leading Ukraine to request permission for a "clearing" operation of Transnistria from "terrorists" and the creation of a security zone up to the Dniester river!
The fact that the "demilitarization" and "de-Russification" of the region is now a priority is also reflected in Chisinau's decision to declare the leadership of the Russian military force in Transnistria unwelcome. As the speaker of parliament, Igor Grosu, stated: "I confirm that there are several persons on this list. They were declared unwelcome in Moldova for the simple reason that the Russian army is located illegally on our territory." From the characterization of "illegal presence" to the recognition of "occupation," there is now only one step remaining.
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