China has directed approximately 145 billion dollars into investments and contracts for infrastructure construction in the Middle East, while Iranian oil alone accounts for 13–14% of its imports.
However, Beijing does not maintain a permanent military presence in the unstable region, with its only overseas base in Djibouti, thousands of kilometers away.
The result is a structural mismatch at the core of Chinese foreign policy: economic ambitions that increasingly depend on a security architecture that Beijing does not control, this is expected to change as the United States loses de facto geopolitical ground in the Middle East.
Following airstrikes by the United States and Israel on Iran, the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of global oil and natural gas normally passes, effectively closed.
Iran’s blockade reduced traffic by more than 90% compared to normal levels, trapping more than 600 ships, including hundreds of tankers, inside the Persian Gulf.
Tehran imposed a selective transit regime, allowing passage to ships from favored countries, including China, Russia, and India, while banning vessels linked to the West.
This de facto blockade or new transit fee regime will be a key issue in United States–Iran negotiations for a peace agreement in Pakistan.
Chinese investments in the countries of the Persian Gulf
China’s approach to the Middle East is based on two pillars: economic integration and diplomatic engagement.
On the economic side, Arab states and the countries of the Persian Gulf received approximately 39 billion dollars in Chinese investments in 2024.
Chinese companies now manage ports, industrial zones, and energy infrastructure across the region, integrating local economies into Chinese trade networks.
In Oman, the China–Oman Industrial Park in Duqm represents more than 10 billion dollars in planned development, Chinese companies have also invested in refinery upgrades and energy infrastructure in Iran.
Alongside this economic expansion, China has sought to strengthen its diplomatic influence by positioning itself as a mediator in regional disputes, primarily facilitating the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023.
Together, these two pillars have allowed China to expand its regional influence without direct confrontation.
However, they leave a critical gap.
Missing from the strategy is a security component, which for years was provided by the United States through a network of military bases in the region and the Fifth Fleet of the US Navy, which, until the war with Iran, ensured maritime trade routes in the Persian Gulf.
Although this system primarily serves American interests, it also protects the sea lanes and energy flows on which China increasingly depends, integrating Beijing ever more deeply into a security environment whose foundations it does not control.
The security gap
For Beijing, the crisis in Iran was a clear demonstration of its structural exposure.
Chinese-flagged ships were among those granted conditional passage, a concession from Tehran, not a guarantee, yet the disruption in energy markets was severe regardless.
Some European and Asian refineries were paying nearly 150 dollars per barrel for certain grades of crude, while the head of the International Energy Agency described Iran’s blockade as more significant than the shocks of 1973, 1979, and 2022 combined.
China’s access to the strait depended entirely on Iran’s goodwill and its own diplomatic standing in Tehran, exactly the kind of fragile and dependent arrangement that highlights how Beijing’s security capacity lags behind its economic exposure in the region.
The United States depends far less on Middle East oil than China, relying largely on domestic production and imports from Canada and Mexico.
China, by contrast, is the world’s largest importer of crude oil and relies heavily on maritime supply routes.
As American dependence on Persian Gulf energy declines, Washington’s strategic incentives may not always align with China’s growing need for regional stability.
Recent developments around Iran illustrate this divergence: the United States’ interest in stability tends to be limited to ensuring energy flows, while China’s broader exposure in infrastructure, supply chains, and investments makes it more sensitive to wider disruptions.
Beijing thus finds itself increasingly exposed within a system it neither controls nor can fully trust.
The dilemma is clear: continue relying on external security provision or take a more direct role in protecting Chinese interests.
China’s geopolitical approach
This choice is constrained by China’s own doctrine.
The Chinese White Paper of 2019 describes the country’s approach as an “independent foreign policy of peace,” reflecting a deep resistance to formal military alliances.
President Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized strategic autonomy and self-reliance, and China’s Global Security Initiative explicitly criticizes military alliances and what it calls a “Cold War mentality.”
These constraints are not only doctrinal but also reputational.
Beijing has framed its rise around peaceful development and non-interference, a more assertive security role in the Middle East could undermine this stance and complicate relations with host states.
Even if Beijing were willing to adjust its strategy, expanding a permanent military presence would likely be politically difficult. The region is highly sensitive to foreign bases and external interventions, a constraint reflected in analyses of China’s limited and cautious overseas presence to date.
All these factors significantly limit Beijing’s ability to translate economic influence into a corresponding security role.
As China’s footprint abroad expands and American commitments become less predictable, the cost of this situation is likely to rise, increasing pressure on Beijing to reconsider its approach.
The required adjustment of China’s strategy
Beijing is not currently signaling a strategic shift, but the growing risks to its overseas interests may impose some adjustment. Any response is likely to take one of two forms: limited naval expansion or greater reliance on host-state security arrangements.
Since 2008, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has maintained continuous anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden, carrying out more than 1,600 escort missions for thousands of ships. Expanding these patrols toward the Arabian Sea or the Strait of Hormuz would allow China to play a more active role in securing key maritime routes.
This approach, however, remains limited: anti-piracy operations can protect commercial shipping, but fall far short of securing infrastructure or managing interstate conflicts.
This suggests that more extensive approaches may ultimately be required.
Sustained operations deeper into the Persian Gulf would require additional bases and support from host countries, yet even China’s existing base in Djibouti has caused friction with the United States, highlighting the political sensitivity of any further expansion of its overseas military presence.
The Pakistan model and the new security doctrine
A limited increase in naval presence could nevertheless have a moderate deterrent effect, raising the political cost of attacks on Chinese vessels and creating a narrow “tripwire” where escalation carries the risk of direct confrontation. However, any expansion is likely to remain gradual and insufficient to address broader risks.
Naval presence, in any case, does little to protect Chinese infrastructure located inland.
This leads to the second approach: strengthening host-state security arrangements.
China has already implemented this model in Pakistan, where a special force of approximately 15,000 soldiers was created to protect Chinese personnel and projects along the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor.
Host-state forces can help protect specific projects and deter non-state threats, but are far less effective against large-scale interstate conflicts or regime instability.
Nevertheless, such arrangements allow China to reduce its exposure at relatively low cost, while remaining consistent with its doctrine of non-interference.
Overall, these approaches reflect a strategy of risk management rather than resolution.
China is likely to continue expanding its economic presence, relying on incremental security measures, limiting exposure without assuming the broader responsibilities of a full security role.
The gap between China’s economic exposure and its security capacity is likely to widen. With approximately 70% of its oil imports passing through vulnerable chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and with hundreds of billions of dollars invested in infrastructure and energy projects in the Middle East, Beijing’s exposure is both deep and growing.
No rising power has maintained global economic reach without eventually assuming corresponding security responsibilities, and China is unlikely to be the first exception.
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