The potential seizure of Kharg island by the United States constitutes an extremely dangerous operation, according to the head of Blackwater PMC, Erik Prince. (Blackwater is the most famous and controversial private military company, founded in 1997 by Prince, a former US Navy SEAL officer.) According to him, an initial attack on the island would be limited in scale, while air power would have to operate in cycles, provided there are no casualties for the American military.
Prince also estimates that a massive landing by the 82nd Airborne Division on Kharg is particularly hazardous. The Iranians are watching and have already integrated FPV drones at a squad level. "You see videos of the Israelis in southern Lebanon losing tanks and armored personnel carriers to the same FPV drones that Russia is essentially using in Ukraine. A war with Iran is not easy. These are not Arabs; they are extremely intelligent and specialized fighters, and it certainly won't be easy, unlike the Iraqi army they faced earlier," the PMC chief emphasized. Earlier, the Khatam al-Anbiya Aerospace Command of the IRGC stated that Iran will "cut off the feet" of any aggressor invading its territory.
A clear sign of desperation
However, according to Noornews, the deployment of ground forces to the region by the United States is not merely a tactical choice on the battlefield, but a clear sign of the enemy's desperation to achieve its predetermined goals using its main operational advantage—air power. Taking such a decision signals a transition from a controlled war to a level of conflict that could overturn the entire security structure of the region. Experience over more than a month has shown that exclusive reliance on air power has not only failed to achieve strategic goals but has pushed the American side toward more dangerous and complex actions.
In this context, although most military experts have characterized the scenario of ground operations as a failure, a potential US entry onto the territory would signify a complete change in the rules of the game: transforming the war from remote operations into a direct, attritional, and multi-layered conflict. This moment represents the true "regionalization of the war." The Leader of the Islamic Revolution had emphasized that any conflict with Iran could escalate quickly beyond national borders due to the interconnected network of American interests, infrastructure, and military presence in the region.
The presence of numerous US military, insurance, and communication bases in regional countries essentially turns them into part of the theater of operations. When these capabilities are used to attack Iran, they naturally become legitimate targets for a response. This is why the war transforms from a limited conflict into a regional one. Iran's recent moves confirm that it adheres to this doctrine in practice: targeting the sources of threat sends a clear message and significantly increases the cost of escalating the conflict.
In this framework, as an Iranian security official told Noor News, a potential entry into a ground war will not be a limited action, but the beginning of a chain reaction, expanding the geography of the conflict to areas that will serve as sources of operations against Iran. Any attempt to change the level of the war inevitably leads to the involvement of multiple regional players—the exact definition of "regionalization of the war." Recent developments demonstrate that regionalization is no longer a theoretical assumption but a direct result of the US military and political presence in the region. The use of these capabilities for an attack creates the legitimacy of a mutual response, both in the air and on the ground, turning the war into a multi-layered regional conflict where the boundaries between geography and geopolitics are essentially eliminated.
Facing a fundamentally different environment
If the ground attack scenario is realized, the United States and its allies will face an environment fundamentally different from traditional aerial and technological war models. In ground warfare, the main advantage lies not in firepower, but in geographical depth, human resources, field experience, and long-term organizational capacity. Iran possesses significant advantages in these areas with its large, well-trained, and operationally experienced ground forces.
In addition to a detailed understanding of operational geography, these forces benefit from experience in asymmetric warfare, a crucial experience in long-duration wars of attrition. Under such conditions, a ground war for the aggressor would not be a short-term operation but a long, costly, and unpredictable process, much more complex to manage than air wars. Beyond the military dimension, the economic dimension of a ground war takes on special importance, given that Iran has announced that in the event of a US ground attack, the Strait of Hormuz will be closed immediately and completely.
Iran's strategic position and control of one of the world's most vital energy corridors make it possible to immediately expand any escalation into global markets. The rise in oil prices, instability in energy markets, and concerns over disruptions to the global supply chain show that a ground war could have consequences far beyond the battlefield. The Strait of Hormuz thus turns into a "decision-making bottleneck," where military and economic factors simultaneously influence the strategy of the parties involved.
One of the defining variables in the dynamics of ground war is the role of the Resistance Front. This network, which in recent years has evolved into a multi-layered and coordinated structure, can expand the battlefield from a limited geography to many active points in the region if the conflict spreads. This leads to a fragmentation of the opponent's military power across multiple fronts, reducing their operational focus and increasing the vulnerability of their military structure. In such a scenario, the war ceases to be linear and turns into a networked, attritional conflict.
The scenario of a US ground invasion is not a sign of superiority but an introduction to a phase of strategic complexity and stalemate. The combination of three key parameters—Iran's ground advantages, the strategic position of the Strait of Hormuz, and the operational capability of the Resistance Front—creates conditions that make any entry into the ground phase costly and multi-layered. In this context, the regionalization of the war is not a future possibility but a reality already taking shape. Thus, a ground war will not be the end of the crisis, but the beginning of a phase where costs, actors, and consequences increase exponentially, making control of the battlefield much more difficult.
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